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**Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory**

Security Council
Sixty-second year

## Letter dated 12 February 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter addressed to you from Mr. Ahmed Aboul Gheit, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt, regarding the Israeli illegal acts in the Holy Al-Aqsa Mosque Compound in East Jerusalem (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Maged **Abdelaziz**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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## Annex to the letter dated 12 February 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

10 February 2007

I write to express our deep concern with regard to the excavation and demolition work being carried out by the Israeli authorities near Al-Aqsa Mosque, on the road leading to Bab al-Magharibah at the Buraq Wall, the western wall of the Haram al-Aqsa (Temple Mount). Public anger is escalating at this step taken by Israel at this critical time in which numerous parties, including the United Nations, are striving to provide the appropriate climate in which to revive the peace process.

Egypt considers that Israel, as the occupying power, should be bound by all of the international resolutions on the status of Jerusalem, respect its holy places and not encroach upon its character or alter the physical features of the religious properties therein, the foremost of which is Al-Aqsa Mosque. Egypt emphasizes that any action pertaining to Al-Aqsa Mosque should be closely coordinated and agreed upon with the relevant Palestinian officials in the Jerusalem Islamic Waqf Administration. Therefore, we support moves aimed at halting unilateral measures on the part of Israel in this regard.

As you may agree, the sanctity of Al-Aqsa Mosque makes any movement inside or around it a highly sensitive issue for all Muslim peoples all over the world. Such actions on the part of Israel have a negative impact on the current efforts to create the appropriate political climate between the Palestinian and Israeli sides, for the stability of the region and to build mutual confidence between them.

(*Signed*) Ahmed **Aboul Gheit**
Minister for Foreign Affairs

United Nations S/2007/104

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# Monthly report of the Secretary-General on Darfur

## I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraphs 6, 13 and 16 of Security Council resolution 1556 (2004), paragraph 15 of Council resolution 1564 (2004), paragraph 17 of Council resolution 1574 (2004) and paragraph 12 of Council resolution 1590 (2005). It covers the months of November and December 2006, and January 2007.

## II. Insecurity in Darfur

2. The security situation in Darfur has been characterized by increased violence during the reporting period. Sudanese Government forces supported by armed militia engaged in clashes with Darfur Peace Agreement non-signatory forces, especially in Northern and Southern Darfur. In their ongoing efforts to flush out non-signatory combatants, the Government of the Sudan intensified aerial bombardment of non-signatory forces positions, including civilian targets. Tension also persisted along the Sudan-Chad border. Humanitarian organizations and the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) suffered harassment and attacks, while theft and carjackings of their vehicles reached new heights in November and December.

3. The reporting period was also marked by clashes between Government forces supported by armed militia and the National Redemption Front (NRF) coalition. The clashes occurred in both Northern and Southern Darfur: in Birmaza, Sani Hayi, Umm Sidr, Sayah, Gubba, Dobo (Northern Darfur), Abu Jabre and Adilya (Southern Darfur). On 15 November, soldiers of the Sudanese armed forces and armed militia, supported by helicopter gunships, attacked several villages in the Birmaza area, killing at least three civilians, torching dozens of houses and destroying four rub halls of an international non-governmental organization (NGO).

4. The Group of 19 (G19) faction of NRF retaliated by attacking Sudanese armed forces and militia forces in several places, including Sani Hayi and Umm Sidr, and attacking Government property, including the oil installations at Abu Jabre on 26 November, which led to heavy clashes between rebels and the Sudanese armed forces. On 4 and 5 December, Government helicopter gunships and an Antonov aircraft bombed the Adilya area (Southern Darfur) in an attack on NRF forces. On 16 December, Government forces and G19 members clashed in Sayah (Northern

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Darfur). Nine G19 members were killed and seven of their vehicles were destroyed. On 20 December, armed militia and Government forces launched a combined ground and air strike against a joint force of the G19 group, Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM)-Abdul Shafi and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Gubba (Northern Darfur). In addition, they launched aerial bombardments on G19 strongholds of Hashaba and Anka (Northern Darfur) on 11 and 21 December, killing eight civilians.

5. Hostilities also broke out between armed militia and SLM-Minawi. On 3 and 4 December, members of SLM-Minawi and armed militia clashed at the El Fasher marketplace. Eight people, including one civilian, were killed in the ensuing violence and looting. On 5 December, one student was killed and two others injured by armed militia in the Al Mudarig area close to El Fasher. On 6 and 7 December, schoolboys and other citizens protested the killing at demonstrations in El Fasher, which culminated in the burning of a tent that served as a classroom in a school in El Fasher.

6. Much of the violence targeted innocent civilians, in contravention of existing ceasefire arrangements and international law. On 18 November, forces of the Government of the Sudan and armed militia attacked and burned a significant portion of the village of Buli (Western Darfur), where more than 10,000 internally displaced persons had found refuge, and looted several villages between Rowata and Bul Bul (Western Darfur). Dozens of civilians were killed and thousands displaced in the attacks. Armed militia also attacked and torched villages, causing the death of many civilians. On 2 December, five civilians were killed and many more displaced in attacks on Abu Sakeen (Northern Darfur), in which 50 houses were burned. On 4 December, armed militia attacked the settlements of Shagbuba, Bunglawy, Um Serena and Hashaba (Northern Darfur), leading to the death of two civilians. On 5 and 6 December, Government aircraft bombarded Shagbuba with ground support from armed militia and killed five civilians. On 9 December, armed men on horseback attacked a commercial vehicle convoy carrying people and medical and other supplies near Runju Runju in the Sirba area (Western Darfur). The truck was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade, and the people in the truck were shot at by the horsemen. Thirty-one civilians, including five schoolteachers, were killed in the attack.

7. On 19 December, an armed group attacked returnees in Arwa (Western Darfur) and looted 150 cows and 300 sheep. Five returnees were killed and eight injured in the attack, after which the perpetrators fled across the border to Chad. The incident occurred in the wake of the signing of a letter of understanding on 13 December, between the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration, which provides a framework for cooperation between the two organizations to help Sudanese refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their homes.

8. Tension along the Sudan-Chad border remained high during the reporting period. On 25 November, Chadian armed opposition groups, allegedly the Rally of Democratic Forces (RFD) and the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD), crossed the Sudanese border into Chad and captured the eastern Chadian town of Abéché, but were pushed back by the Chadian armed forces on the following day. The incident occurred soon after the summit held on 21 November 2006 in Tripoli, where the Sudan and Chad met under a Libyan peace initiative that

included Egypt, Eritrea and the Central African Republic. On 28 November, Chad declared itself in a "state of war" with the Sudan over the latter's alleged support of Chadian rebels. On 12 December, fighting between Chadian armed opposition groups and the Chadian armed forces at Armankul (Western Darfur) resulted in displacement of the local population.

9. More than 24 humanitarian vehicles were carjacked or stolen in the period under review. On 7 December, three vehicles belonging to an international NGO were stolen in Khor Abeche (Southern Darfur). On 9 December, an international NGO vehicle was taken at gunpoint near Azerni (Western Darfur), while, on 11 December, three international NGO vehicles were stolen at gunpoint near Muhajariya (Southern Darfur) by armed men on camelback. On the same day, a United Nations agency vehicle that had been donated to the local Department of Health was stolen at gunpoint by Arab militiamen near the Krinding II internally displaced person camp (outside Geneina town). On 12 December, three armed men carjacked an international NGO vehicle near Ardemata (in Geneina town) and abducted the two staff members who were in it. The carjackers then drove the vehicle some distance from Ardemata, sold it to another party and released the staff members. Two international NGO vehicles were stolen in El Geneina (Western Darfur) in separate incidents on 13 and 14 December. On 18 December, armed men attacked two international NGO compounds in Gereida (Western Darfur) and brutally assaulted and raped two international NGO staff. The perpetrators also stole 12 vehicles, along with mobile and satellite phones, laptops and other electronic communication equipment.

10. International NGO staff continued to be harassed by armed groups, while armed militia and Government forces also hindered humanitarian aid delivery. On 7 December, a group of armed men forcefully entered an international NGO complex in Khor Abeche and physically assaulted several of the organization's staff members. On 18 December, an international NGO ambulance and its Government police escort vehicle were ambushed near Khorbomba (Western Darfur) and one staff nurse was shot in the leg.

11. Government attacks on humanitarian personnel also occurred over the reporting period. On 19 January, local police and security officials raided the compound of an international NGO in Nyala and arrested 20 people, including five staff members of United Nations agencies and a number of AMIS and NGO staff. Those arrested, including United Nations staff, were subjected to physical assault and verbal abuse by the Nyala police during their arrest and detention. One female United Nations staff member was sexually abused during the arrest and several sustained serious injuries, some of which required urgent medical treatment.

12. Armed banditry continued during November and December. On 15 November, armed men looted trucks carrying World Food Programme (WFP) supplies near Kutum (Northern Darfur). On 2 December, armed militia and Government forces attacked the villages of Hilat Amar Jadeed and Lamena (Northern Darfur) during a scheduled food distribution. In Hilat Amar Jadeed, soldiers and armed men looted food and supplies and severely wounded three persons. In Lamena, witnesses reported that Sudanese Government soldiers shot at civilians, resulting in the death of at least three persons and the injury of five more, including two children.

13. Attacks on AMIS personnel, property and installations have also increased. The situation was particularly serious in Northern and Western Darfur, where

internally displaced persons and civilians attacked AMIS personnel. The following locations were targeted: the Zam Zam internally displaced person camp post on 5 December, and the AMIS headquarters near El Geneina airport on 10 December, which resulted in the death of three civilians. On 10 December, an AMIS vehicle carrying two AMIS military personnel was carjacked in El Fasher. The whereabouts of the two abducted AMIS personnel are still unknown. Two other AMIS vehicles were stolen in December: one in El Fasher on 14 December, the other in Khor Abeche on 15 December. AMIS investigations were also hindered by civilians upset by the prevailing insecurity and violence. In one instance, the AMIS investigation team that went to Sirba on 9 December to inquire into the Runju Runju incident was detained overnight by local civilians. The killing of an AMIS civilian police officer during the hijacking of an AMIS vehicle in Northern Darfur on 1 February also underscored the increasingly dangerous environment in Darfur.

## III. Human rights and protection

14. Security in and around internally displaced person camps continued to remain precarious, with killings, looting and harassment of internally displaced persons and gender-related crimes against female internally displaced persons. Concurrently, the number of displaced persons arriving at the internally displaced person camps increased because of the attacks. In addition, Government authorities continued to restrict the freedom of movement of United Nations personnel.

15. Violence persisted in internally displaced person camps and against internally displaced persons. On 5 December, two groups of internally displaced persons clashed in the Kalma camp (Southern Darfur), and one internally displaced person was shot dead and two others were injured. On 8 December, armed militia shot dead three internally displaced persons from the Shangil Tobayi camp (Northern Darfur), after stealing their cattle. On 19 December, armed men shot and wounded an internally displaced person at the El Sherif camp (Southern Darfur), following an attempt to steal his cattle the previous day. In a related incident, again on 19 December, armed men attacked some men in the Otash internally displaced person camp (Southern Darfur) and stole their money.

16. Female internally displaced persons faced harassment, assault and rape by members of various armed factions. On 13 November, three female internally displaced persons were raped at the Kalma camp (Northern Darfur) and, on 14 November, one woman was raped in the Tawilla camp (Northern Darfur). On 25 November, two female internally displaced persons were attacked close to the Mornei camp (Western Darfur) by three armed men who also raped them.

17. Civilians also continued to be displaced as a result of the ongoing violence. The clashes in Northern and Southern Darfur during November displaced approximately 22,000 people. The attacks on Abu Sakeen and Armankul also led to a large displacement of the local population. On 4 December, residents of Kullo (Northern Darfur) had to evacuate to the internally displaced person camp at Tawilla (Northern Darfur), following attacks on their village by SLM-Minawi members who claimed the land for themselves.

18. United Nations staff also continued to be hindered in their work by restrictions imposed by Government authorities, in violation of the status-of-forces agreement. On 16 November, upon landing in Kornoi (Northern Darfur), a group of United

Nations staff were searched and questioned by the Sudanese armed forces. On 13 December, a United Nations agency team was prevented from travelling to the Zam Zam internally displaced person camp without a humanitarian assistance coordination travel permit, and on 20 December, national security officials prevented a United Nations vehicle, with UNMIS personnel, from proceeding from El Fasher to Mallit on the same grounds. Again, on 20 December, a United Nations helicopter flight that was scheduled to transport people from El Fasher to Fanga (Northern Darfur) was refused permission because the aircraft was based in Kadugli, not in El Fasher.

## IV. Humanitarian situation

19. Humanitarian aid access declined steeply in November and December owing to widespread insecurity and the theft of an unprecedented number of aid vehicles. The frequent attacks and harassment also led to the relocation of a large number of humanitarian aid workers.

20. In November, 95 per cent of the roads in Western Darfur were unusable for security reasons. In December, only two roads were certified safe for United Nations and international NGO movement in and around the El Geneina area (Western Darfur). Among the closed roads were the vital Abu Surug-Geneina commercial road and the road to Um Kher. Due to the prevailing insecurity, humanitarian organizations were unable to assess the humanitarian situation in Birmaza and Jebel Marra (Western Darfur). The theft of aid vehicles further restricted the mobility of humanitarian workers.

21. Due to the prevailing insecurity, over 400 humanitarian workers were relocated on 11 separate occasions, which affected humanitarian and emergency aid delivery to around 850,000 conflict-affected people. On 5 December, following the violence in El Fasher, 52 humanitarian aid staff, along with 82 United Nations personnel, were relocated to Khartoum. The day after the theft of vehicles on 7 December from an international NGO compound in Khor Abeche, 11 of its staff members were relocated to Nyala. Following an attempted break-in at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) compound in Kutum (Northern Darfur) and the resultant shooting, 32 ICRC, international NGO and United Nations agency staff were relocated to El Fasher the following day, 8 December. Three international NGOs temporarily relocated 30 staff members on 9 December from Al Daien (Southern Darfur) to Nyala, due to the prevailing tensions in the area. On 19 December, 71 international NGO and NGO members were relocated to Nyala following the attack, theft and harassment of staff in two international NGO compounds in Gereida the previous night.

22. There have been 28 such relocations since the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement on 5 May 2006, which has impacted humanitarian aid to the affected populations. Notably, the largest single relocation in December from Gereida has affected humanitarian support to the Gereida camp, which is the largest internally displaced person camp in Darfur, with over 130,000 inhabitants. By November, the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance had risen to around 4 million, representing roughly two thirds of the Darfur population. On 20 November, the Southern Darfur authorities expelled the international NGO Norwegian Refugee

Council, claiming its reports of rape cases in the Kalma camp were inflated. That significantly reduced humanitarian aid activities in Southern Darfur.

23. Despite these daunting challenges, humanitarian aid workers have persisted in their effort to deliver humanitarian aid to those in need and to carry on developmental activities.

24. As a result of the ongoing conflict, 70 per cent of the war-affected population in Darfur is now dependent on external food aid and agencies like WFP that continue to deliver food aid to over 2.6 million people every month. Around 92 per cent of the target population in Darfur has been inoculated against polio. As a result of the efforts of the United Nations Children's Fund over the reporting period, 9,500 people will get access to potable water in internally displaced person camps in Southern Darfur. The maintenance of water schemes in another eight Southern Darfur internally displaced person camps during December benefited more than 130,000 internally displaced persons. Primary school enrolment in Darfur increased from 47 per cent to 63 per cent during 2006.

## V. Implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement

25. During the reporting period, high-level consultations on Darfur took place in Addis Ababa on 16 November, which my predecessor co-chaired with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Alpha Oumar Konaré. Preparatory work for the convening of a conference of non-signatories and rationalization of the various initiatives to broaden the base of the Darfur Peace Agreement are ongoing. In December, further progress was made to reinforce the ceasefire mechanism, including the creation of a second chamber of the Ceasefire Commission for non-signatories.

26. The Security Council has already been apprised of the conclusions of the Addis Ababa deliberations of 16 November. The discussions resulted in a clear agreement that only a negotiated political settlement could bring the conflict in Darfur to an end. The meeting also concurred that the Darfur Peace Agreement would remain at the heart of any settlement but would need to be made more inclusive, and that the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation has a key role to play in complementing the Darfur Peace Agreement. The meeting further concluded that the political process should be all-inclusive. The conclusions recognized that the current proliferation of initiatives must be streamlined and brought under one umbrella. To that end, the conclusions indicated that the United Nations and the African Union were best positioned to lead this process and called on international partners for support whenever appropriate.

27. The Council will recall that, pursuant to the Addis Ababa and Abuja agreements of November 2006, my predecessor appointed Jan Eliasson, former Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs and former President of the General Assembly, as the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Darfur, with the objective of re-energizing the political process. In agreement with African Union Commission Chairperson Konaré, he will undertake this challenging task in full partnership with African Union Special Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim. To help establish this close working relationship, I met with Mr. Salim and Mr. Eliasson in New York in early January to discuss the situation in Darfur and their future collaboration. During his stay in New York, Special Envoy Eliasson received briefings at the Secretariat and

held consultations with representatives of a large number of Member States, including members of the Security Council.

28. I subsequently dispatched my Special Envoy to Addis Ababa to meet with the African Union leadership and discuss the joint African Union-United Nations endeavour to re-energize the political process. Special Envoy Eliasson then visited the Sudan from 9 to 12 January. During his stay in the Sudan he held talks with President Bashir and other officials of the Government of National Unity. The Special Envoy also met with Presidential Assistant Mini Minawi, who is the head of the SLM faction that signed the Darfur Peace Agreement on 5 May 2006. The initial response of the Sudanese Government to Special Envoy Eliasson's mission was positive. President Bashir acknowledged the futility of pursuing a military option to resolve the Darfur issue and declared the Government's preparedness to enter into peace talks on Darfur on the basis of the Darfur Peace Agreement. Special Envoy Eliasson also visited El Fasher, where he received briefings from local UNMIS and AMIS leadership. He also met some representatives of the non-signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement, as well as internally displaced person representatives. Throughout his consultations, Special Envoy Eliasson emphasized the need for the level of violence to decrease, so as to allow the political process to move forward.

29. From 29 to 30 January, I attended the African Union summit in Addis Ababa. Special Envoy Eliasson joined me in meetings on the situation in Darfur with key African member States. African Union Commission Chairperson Konaré and I agreed that our Special Envoys would visit the Sudan from 11 to 17 February. During that visit they would continue discussions with Government officials and non-signatory field commanders on the ground in Darfur.

30. With regard to strengthening ceasefire mechanisms, the Joint Commission meeting held on 12 November in Addis Ababa approved the establishment of a "second chamber" to the Ceasefire Commission. This second chamber provides a forum for AMIS to hold discussions with Darfur Peace Agreement non-signatories and impress upon them their obligation to abide by pre-Darfur Peace Agreement ceasefire obligations and to facilitate humanitarian access in their areas of control. On 24 December, the second chamber held its first meeting in El Fasher, which was attended by representatives of the Sudanese Government, SLA-Abdul Wahid and JEM, as well as AMIS and the United Nations. At the meeting, which was chaired by the AMIS Force Commander (who is the Chairman of the Ceasefire Commission), all parties welcomed the establishment of the mechanism. On 15 December, a high-level Joint Commission meeting in Addis Ababa emphasized the importance of the urgent disarmament of armed militia and other effective measures to address the issue of violence in Darfur. It also addressed ceasefire violations and took measures to ensure accountability by signatories and non-signatories alike.

31. In a related development, on 27 December, members from the three non-signatory parties, the SLM-Abdul Wahid, SLM-Abdul Shafi and G19, announced their merger into one movement known as the SLM-Non-Signatory Factions. They also announced a cessation of hostilities unless attacked and reiterated their commitment to the N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement. The Birmaza area in Northern Darfur, where their meeting took place, was bombed, however, two days after the meeting.

# VI. United Nations support to the African Union Mission in the Sudan

32. The three-phased United Nations support package proposal was taken forward at the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) meeting held in Abuja on 30 November, when PSC endorsed the United Nations support package for AMIS and extended the mandate of AMIS for a further six months, from 1 January 2007.

33. To clarify some aspects regarding the implementation of the Addis and Abuja agreements, my predecessor wrote to President Bashir on 19 December. That letter was delivered by Ambassador Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, who visited Khartoum as my predecessor's envoy. On 23 December, pursuant to his visit, the Government of the Sudan confirmed its acceptance of the three-phased approach to peacekeeping in Darfur.

34. The Council will recall that the first phase calls for a small number of advisers to join AMIS: 105 staff officers, 33 civilian police advisers and 48 civilian staff in both substantive and support areas. The plan also calls for the provision of some assets to AMIS: 8 fly-away kits, 36 global positioning systems, 360 night-vision goggles, 36 armoured personnel carriers and some equipment for use in public information campaigns. Deployment of these personnel and assets is well under way, but must now be accelerated. There are currently a total of 81 military and police officers deployed to Darfur under the "light support package".

35. The second phase — or "heavy" package — of United Nations support to AMIS was finalized during a second round of consultations undertaken in Addis Ababa between the African Union and United Nations teams on 20 and 21 January. During the discussions, it was agreed that the United Nations will provide a number of critical enabling capabilities to AMIS totalling 2,250 military personnel, including personnel dedicated to providing static camp protection; 3 formed police units and 301 individual police advisers, for a total of 721 civilian police; and 1,136 civilian personnel to undertake substantive tasks related to the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (civil affairs, humanitarian affairs, public information, etc.) and provide support to administrative and management structures. The heavy package will also include equipment and support required for AMIS to reorganize its present structure from eight sectors to three.

36. The military capabilities include: one transport unit; four engineering units; one signal unit and one logistics unit; one level 2 hospital unit and one level 3 hospital unit; one reconnaissance unit providing three fixed-wing aircraft; one aviation unit providing six light tactical helicopters; and one aviation unit providing six utility helicopters. In accordance with the AMIS concept of operations, the six light tactical helicopters would act as force multipliers and assist in the protection of civilians at risk, AMIS and United Nations personnel, as well as equipment, installations and assets.

37. The police component of the heavy package envisages the deployment of three formed police units to complement AMIS civilian police in performing its tasks, which include: (a) protecting civilians and vulnerable communities under threat of violence, as well as United Nations and African Union personnel and facilities; (b) maintaining a 24-hour presence in internally displaced person camps; (c) performing escort duties (collection of firewood, grass and water); and (d) conducting confidence-building patrols.

38. Darfur has until recently been largely free of the threat of landmines; however, a rise in civilian casualties owing to landmines and unexploded ordnance has been registered, with four deaths and 11 injuries reported in just the first few weeks of 2007. Reports in early February also indicated that landmines may have been transported to El Geneina for use along the border with Chad and possibly on roads. AMIS has also reported unexploded ordnance in close proximity to scarce water sources and along patrol routes, posing a threat to civilians and AMIS peacekeepers. For these reasons, the second phase of United Nations support to AMIS will include a mine action component that will focus on information gathering, surveying routes used by AMIS and the local population, and explosive ordnance disposal.

39. Due to the evolving security situation in Darfur and the changes in the mandate and concepts of operations of AMIS, the requirements for the second phase of United Nations support to AMIS are significantly greater than those envisaged in the report of the former Secretary-General dated 28 July 2006 (S/2006/591). These requirements have been identified jointly by the United Nations and the African Union and, in accordance with the Addis Ababa and Abuja decisions of November 2006, reflect the deployment of the heavy package in anticipation of a hybrid African Union-United Nations peacekeeping operation.

40. An indicative preliminary breakdown of the financial implications of the second phase of United Nations support to AMIS by main categories of expenditure is provided in the annex to the present report. Following the Council's endorsement of the second phase of United Nations support to AMIS, I intend to revert to the General Assembly to obtain authorization for the financing of this second phase.

41. African Union Commission Chairperson Konaré and I sent the details of the heavy support package to President Bashir on 24 January. While President Bashir reaffirmed in his letter dated 23 December 2006 to my predecessor the readiness of the Government of the Sudan to start immediately, through the tripartite committee, the implementation of the Addis Ababa conclusions and Abuja communiqué, I have asked the President to reiterate in writing his acceptance of the heavy support package. Thus far, the President has not responded.

42. All aspects of the hybrid operation, or the third and final phase of the three-phased approach, will be finalized in close consultation with the African Union. In the meantime, specialists from the African Union Commission and the United Nations met in Addis Ababa from 22 to 24 January with the objective of determining the basic framework of the hybrid operation. In particular, the consultations focused on the basic features of the mandate of the hybrid operation, force size, command and control arrangements, and force generation and funding requirements. These consultations produced a common understanding of the essential characteristics of the hybrid operation, providing a platform for joint African Union-United Nations efforts to finalize all related operational plans.

43. In December, the tripartite committee mechanism, consisting of representatives of the Sudanese Government, the African Union and the United Nations, began functioning. The mechanism was set up to facilitate the implementation of United Nations support to AMIS. It met in Khartoum three times during the reporting period. At the last meeting on 26 December, the Sudanese Government accepted that United Nations personnel deployed to assist AMIS in Darfur would wear United Nations blue berets and AMIS armbands.

44. While efforts to implement the three-phased approach continue, it will be critical that the current partners maintain their financial support to AMIS throughout the remainder of the AMIS mandate.

## VII. Observations

45. The increase in violence and tension in Darfur during the months of November, December and January stretched the capacity of AMIS to the limit. The timely extension of the AMIS mandate needs to be followed by appropriate funding and staffing from the international community to enable it to function effectively. I appeal to donors to provide urgent support in all areas related to the Mission's continued operations and agreed expansion by two battalions. In addition, I appeal to Member States for urgent contributions of human resources and equipment needed for the United Nations light and heavy support packages for AMIS, in order to make possible the delivery of timely and effective reinforcements to AMIS. Of particular importance will be the enabling units described in section VI above.

46. I welcome the establishment of the second chamber of the Ceasefire Commission and the declaration of cessation of hostilities by some non-signatory groups as steps in the right direction. However, these declarations must be implemented on the ground and matched by reciprocal actions by all parties, in particular the Government of the Sudan. It is also critical that all armed militia be disarmed for the effort to succeed. I encourage the parties to use the second chamber mechanism as a means to facilitate a negotiated and inclusive political settlement to the crisis.

47. As long as violence and attacks continue in Darfur, the efforts to reach a political settlement will not succeed. I therefore call upon all parties to agree to and implement a cessation of hostilities and commit to the resumption of peace talks on the basis of the Darfur Peace Agreement. I also ask them to cooperate fully with my Special Envoy for Darfur and with the Special Envoy of the African Union in their joint efforts to facilitate a sustainable political solution.

48. I am distressed by the deteriorating humanitarian and security situation on the ground. All parties must cease violent attacks on civilians. I particularly deplore the aerial bombings by Sudanese Government forces, which have expanded to new areas since 16 January, resulting in more civilian casualties and suffering. When my Special Envoy visited Khartoum in early January, President Bashir affirmed that there can be no military solution to the conflict and reiterated his Government's commitment to a political process. In fulfilment of that commitment, I urge the Government to put an end to the aerial bombings and to take immediate action to hold accountable the perpetrators of attacks against civilians.

49. The violence of the last three months has had a further negative effect on humanitarian aid access and delivery in Darfur. The high levels of risk confronting humanitarian organizations in their day-to-day activities are becoming critical and may jeopardize the humanitarian presence in Darfur. This reinforces the urgent need for a ceasefire and an effective political process. I welcome the decision of the Government of the Sudan to extend the moratorium on restrictions for humanitarian work in Darfur by another year from February 2007. However, its "fast track" regulations must be put into practice to allow unhindered humanitarian access and to avoid the continuation of attacks and other incidents that perpetuate the killing,

displacement and general insecurity in the Darfur region. At the same time, I view the 19 January incident in Nyala, in which local police and security officials arrested and physically abused international humanitarian staff, as unacceptable, and call on the Government to ensure that the perpetrators will be held accountable.

50. During my attendance at the African Union summit in Addis Ababa on 29 and 30 January, I had the opportunity to discuss a range of issues of common interest to the United Nations and the African Union with a number of African Heads of State, including African Union Commission Chairperson Konaré. I stressed that I regard Darfur as an issue of the highest priority.

51. In my meetings with Chairperson Konaré, we discussed the urgency of obtaining a cessation of hostilities and reinvigorating the peace process in Darfur. To this end, we considered how the work of our Special Envoys for Darfur, Jan Eliasson and Salim Ahmed Salim, could best be coordinated. I stressed to Chairperson Konaré that the United Nations intends to collaborate fully with the African Union in our efforts to put the peace process back on track, and that it was important to build upon the work that the African Union has already done in that regard. We agreed that Special Envoys Eliasson and Salim would work closely together. We also agreed that they would travel to Khartoum and Darfur from 11 to 17 February, in order to hold talks with Government officials and non-signatories of the Darfur Peace Agreement.

52. In Addis Ababa, I also had the opportunity to meet and hold frank discussions with President Bashir. While our views clearly differed on the gravity of the security situation in Darfur, the President reaffirmed his Government's agreement to the three-phased approach endorsed by the 16 November high-level meeting in Addis Ababa and the meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council on 30 November in Abuja. I view this as positive and intend to strongly encourage President Bashir to uphold his commitment.

53. We also discussed at length the final phase of the three-phased approach, or the joint African Union-United Nations hybrid operation. I reiterated the United Nations position in this regard, making it clear that it was essential to have a joint command and control structure acceptable to United Nations Member States contributing troops and police to the operation. I pointed out that United Nations financing may not otherwise be forthcoming. I also reiterated my predecessor's commitment to strive to maintain the African character of the hybrid operation as much as possible. However, I stressed that we would have to consider offers from other troop- and police-contributing countries if there was not sufficient African capacity. I look forward to receiving from the Government of the Sudan a confirmation of their readiness to implement both the heavy package of United Nations support to AMIS and the hybrid African Union-United Nations operation. In the meantime, the United Nations is proceeding with the preparatory work to implement these plans.

54. In conclusion, I appeal, in the strongest possible terms, to the Government of the Sudan and the other parties to desist from further hostilities, which destabilize the entire region and render peace an increasingly distant prospect. All parties must submit to dialogue and negotiation, and commit themselves to a non-military solution to the devastating conflict in Darfur.

# Annex

## Financial implications of the second phase of United Nations support to the African Union Mission in the Sudan

1. Further to paragraph 40 of my report on Darfur above, I wish to inform the Security Council that, based on the preliminary estimates of requirements for the full deployment of military personnel, United Nations police, formed police units and civilian personnel, the financial implication for the second phase of support that the United Nations could offer to the African Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) amounts to some $287.9 million on a full cost basis for a six-month period.

2. This preliminary projection of $287.9 million for the second phase of United Nations support to AMIS for a six-month period provides for a full deployment of 2,250 military personnel, 301 United Nations police and 3 formed police units, with each unit comprising of 140 formed police personnel. The projection also provides for the full deployment of 383 international and 561 national personnel, as well as 192 United Nations volunteers. Main items under operational costs in this preliminary projection of the second phase include: 1,147 units of prefabricated facilities and $60.1 million for various construction services provided under facilities and infrastructure; the acquisition of 511 units of light, medium and heavy vehicles provided under ground transportation; six-month rental of four aircraft (Let 410), six utility helicopters (MI-17) and six tactical helicopters (MI-25); the acquisition of various communications, information technology and medical equipment; and a $6.9 million provision for mine detection and mine clearing services.

3. An indicative preliminary breakdown of the financial implications for the second phase of United Nations support to AMIS is provided, for information purposes only, in the table below.

Table

**Preliminary cost estimates for the second phase of United Nations support to the African Union Mission in the Sudan for a six-month period**

(Thousands of United States dollars)

| *Category* | *Cost estimates* |
|---|---|
| **Military and police personnel** | |
| Military observers | — |
| Military contingents | 50 870.8 |
| United Nations police | 6 117.1 |
| Formed police units | 9 786.0 |
| **Subtotal** | **66 773.9** |

| *Category* | *Cost estimates* |
|---|---|
| **Civilian personnel** | |
| International staff | 29 982.8 |
| National staff | 4 143.8 |
| United Nations Volunteers | 5 402.2 |
| **Subtotal** | **39 528.8** |
| **Operational costs** | |
| General temporary assistance | — |
| Government-provided personnel | — |
| Civilian electoral observers | — |
| Consultants | — |
| Official travel | 323.4 |
| Facilities and infrastructure | 97 464.2 |
| Ground transportation | 18 249.9 |
| Air transportation | 23 710.3 |
| Naval transportation | — |
| Communications | 16 151.6 |
| Information technology | 9 952.3 |
| Medical | 4 769.4 |
| Special equipment | 1 101.8 |
| Other supplies, services and equipment | 9 951.5 |
| Quick-impact projects | — |
| **Subtotal** | **181 674.4** |
| **Gross requirements** | **287 977.1** |
| Staff assessment income | 3 683.9 |
| **Net requirements** | **284 293.2** |
| Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) | |
| **Total requirements** | **287 977.1** |

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Agenda items 17 and 27

Security Council
Sixty-second year

**The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan**

**Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development**

## Letter dated 22 February 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to submit to you the text of an appeal of refugees from Khojaly to the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the Khojaly genocide (see annex).

On the night of 25 to 26 February 1992, as a result of a horrible crime perpetrated by the Armenian armed forces, the town of Khojaly was burned to the ground. A total of 613 people, including 106 women, 63 children and 70 elderly men were mercilessly killed, 1,275 people were taken hostage, while the fate of over 150 others remains unknown.

The remaining residents of Khojaly, who suffered one of the most terrible acts of genocide of the twentieth century, are still convinced that the world community, including the United Nations, will condemn the Armenian military aggression and assist in the restoration of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and the return of more than 1 million refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 17 and 27, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Agshin **Mehdiyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

07-24936 (E) 270207

## Annex to the letter dated 22 February 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

## Appeal of refugees from Khojaly to the Organization of the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the Khojaly genocide

We, the witnesses of the Khojaly genocide committed in February 1992 in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan, who miraculously survived the tragedy, once more appeal with high hope to the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and to all the civilized world community, and call for the necessity of rendering a legal and political assessment to the Khojaly genocide.

In order to realize their plan of creating "Great Armenia", Armenians, who built a monument in 1978 on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of their migration to Azerbaijan from Iran, pursued a consistent policy of aggression against Azerbaijan in the last two centuries with the assistance of their foreign accomplices and committed such crimes against humanity as terrorism, homicide, deportation and genocide.

Numerous historical documents prove that the millions of Azerbaijanis suffering ethnic cleansing and genocide in the periods 1905-1907, 1918-1920 and 1948-1953 in their historical ethnic territories were murdered en masse or obliged to flee from their native lands.

Finally, Armenian separatism and groundless territorial claims against Azerbaijan were raised again in 1998 and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict started. During 1988-1989, 250,000 Azerbaijanis, to the last man, were deported from their historical ethnic territories in Armenia, with hundreds of civilians brutally killed in the process. Consequently, Armenia became a mono-ethnic country, which was a long-cherished dream of Armenians.

Unfortunately, the former Soviet leadership and the civilized world remained indifferent to the groundless Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that started in 1988, the barbarity of Armenians and the torment of Azerbaijanis. Encouraged by this indifference, Armenians succeeded in committing bloody crimes one after another in Azerbaijan. Twenty per cent of the territory of Azerbaijan, including seven regions around Nagorno-Karabakh, was occupied by Armenian armed forces, more than 1 million Azerbaijanis expelled from native lands, tens of thousands of people killed, disabled or taken hostage. Hundreds of settlements, thousands of houses, education and health institutions, historical-cultural monuments, museums, mosques, temples and cemeteries were destroyed, once more proving Armenian vandalism.

At the beginning of the 1990s, mass slaughter committed by Armenian armed troops against the Azerbaijani population of Karabakh in the villages of Kerkijahan, Mesheli, Koushchular, Karadaghly and Aghdaban, terrorist acts in Baku and other cities, and finally the Khojaly genocide are historical stigma of "suffering and miserable" Armenians.

We bring with regret to the attention of the world community that the Khojaly genocide was another link in the chain of great human calamities of the twentieth century such as Khatyn, Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Songmi.

On 26 February 1992, Armenian armed forces, with the direct participation of the 366th Motorized Infantry Regiment of the former Soviet Union located in Khankendi (Stepanakert), attacked Khojaly city (where 7,000 Azerbaijanis were living) from five directions. At that very time, 3,000 people remained in the town. Armenians had been keeping Khojaly under complete siege for the previous four months. The population was in need of food and medicine. There were a number of sick, wounded, aged men, women and children in the town.

Armenians razed to the ground and burned the town by means of the heavy military equipment of the 366th Regiment. Innocent civilians were murdered, with children, women, the elderly and sick being subject to awful torture and mutilation. Armenians committed a very grave historical crime — the Khojaly genocide against the Azerbaijanis at the end of the twentieth century before the eyes of civilized humankind. The aim of this action was the homicide of Khojaly residents. The majority of the residents remained alive only by accident to witness the tragedy.

As a result of this genocide, 613 peaceful residents were murdered and 1,275 taken hostage. The fate of 150 of them is still unknown. More than 1,000 people were disabled by bullet wounds; 83 children, 106 women and 70 elderly people were among the killed; and 78 of the mutilated were minor boys and girls.

As a result of this military-political crime, six families were murdered to the last man, 25 children lost both parents and 130 children lost one parent; 56 men were either burned alive, scalped, tortured, beheaded or blinded, and pregnant women were bayoneted.

It is difficult to believe that this brutality and savageness, without any match in history, was committed by human beings at the end of the twentieth century before the eyes of humankind. But humanity should be aware that the perpetrators of this crime committed against not only Azerbaijanis, but the whole of mankind, are "suffering and miserable" Armenians.

For 15 years, we, the residents of Khojaly, have been living the life of refugees. We appeal to all peaceful peoples and international organizations of the world with heartache mixed with high hope. We do not believe that such authoritative organizations as the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe as well as powerful nations are incapable of bringing Armenia, a State which defies international law and human values, to justice and to respect civilized relations between States.

The non-fulfilment of four resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations on the unconditional withdrawal of Armenian troops from the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan damages the image of this Organization.

We are convinced that the world community, condemning the military aggression of Azerbaijan by Armenia, will assist in the restoration of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, the return of more than 1 million refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes and the settlement of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh fairly and in a peaceful manner.

The appeal was adopted at the general gathering of refugees from Khojaly, held in Baku on 19 February 2007.

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# United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission

## Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Security Council the twenty-eighth quarterly report on the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). It is submitted by the Acting Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999).

07-23529 (E) 270207

# Twenty-eighth quarterly report on the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999)

## I. Introduction

1. The present report, which is the twenty-eighth submitted in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), covers the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) during the period from 1 December 2006 to 28 February 2007.

## II. Developments

2. During the period under review, the Acting Executive Chairman continued the practice of briefing the respective Presidents of the Security Council, representatives of Member States and officials of the Secretariat on the activities of UNMOVIC. In December 2006, he visited the Commission's field office in Larnaca, Cyprus.

## III. Other activities

### Compendium of proscribed weapons programmes of Iraq

3. Tables, graphics, photographs and a list of references are being added to the compendium. The database has been reviewed for additional references and individual sections of the compendium are being subjected to internal review and scrutiny. The sanitized version, with sensitive material appropriately redacted, is on schedule for completion by early summer, to be placed on the Commission's website thereafter.

### Verification of missiles and other unmanned aerial delivery systems

4. The Commission's twenty-third quarterly report (S/2005/742) provided details of a review by a panel of external technical experts of the missile provisions of the monitoring and verification plan in the light of the changed situation in Iraq. UNMOVIC has continued to develop an updated system for future inspection and verification of missiles and other unmanned aerial delivery vehicles, drawing on the Commission's experience in this area.

5. Central to this system is the concept of "critical points" which are steps or specific pieces of equipment that must be utilized in the development and production process. A verification scheme based on these "critical points" can be more effective and efficient than previous approaches. In addition, advances in technology make available a variety of equipment, sensors, computer hardware and software that have been identified as suitable for use in the verification process. Application of this new technology, particularly at "critical points", could optimize the use of human resources while at the same time providing relevant and reliable technical data.

6. The updated system being proposed thus provides a model that is more effective, less intrusive and with an improved level of efficiency. This approach is being further developed and is being included in the UNMOVIC ongoing training programme for its international roster of inspectors. Further details are provided in the annex to this report.

## IV. Other issues

### Field offices

7. In Baghdad, the two remaining UNMOVIC local staff, co-located with the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq in the international zone, perform routine maintenance on the office support equipment and the mobile laboratory that had been brought from the Canal compound when it closed.

8. In Cyprus, UNMOVIC reduced its field office space requirement by 50 per cent. The Acting Executive Chairman, accompanied by the Director of the Division of Information, Technical Support and Training, visited the Commission's field office from 13 to 15 December and held discussions with the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Nicosia. They also met the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Cyprus and the Chief Administrative Officer of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). During this visit, meetings were also held with the private company that has taken over operation of the airport at Larnaca from the Cyprus Department of Civil Aviation. The inspection and laboratory equipment recovered from the chemical and biological laboratories in Baghdad was made ready for maintenance by UNMOVIC experts.

### Staffing

9. At the end of February 2007, UNMOVIC headquarters core staff at the Professional level totalled 34. The staff is drawn from 19 nationalities; 7 are women.

### UNMOVIC network of analytical laboratories

10. Extensions of the contracts for the provision of analytical services by 11 international laboratories, members of the network, are being processed.

### Technical visits, meetings and workshops

11. UNMOVIC was represented at the eleventh session of the Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which was held at The Hague, the Netherlands, from 5 to 8 December 2006.

12. From 8 to 12 January, two UNMOVIC experts attended the Conference on Science and Technology for Chemical-Biological Information Systems in Austin, Texas, United States of America. Participants at the Conference presented a wide variety of projects from different governmental agencies, scientific companies and vendors for the development of chemical and biological defence-related databases, knowledge bases and novel information technologies that can ensure higher efficiency of protection against chemical and biological weapons.

13. From 6 to 12 January, one UNMOVIC missile technical analyst participated in the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics professional training course entitled "Modeling of Six Degrees of Freedom; Missile Simulation" held at Reno, Nevada, United States of America.

14. Two UNMOVIC experts are attending the fifth meeting of the American Society of Microbiology in Washington, D.C., from 27 February to 2 March. The meeting is to discuss emerging disease research as well as diagnostics, detection and decontamination, and microbial forensics of biological threat agents. In addition, presentations and discussions cover bacterial virulence, vaccine and therapeutic development and the dual-use nature of biological research.

**Training**

15. On 15 and 16 February, three UNMOVIC experts attended a training course organized by the International Air Transport Association in Newark, New Jersey, United States of America, on dangerous goods regulations for shipping toxic materials via commercial flights, and renewed their certificates on the subject. Similar training for two UNMOVIC staff from the Cyprus office is in progress.

16. UNMOVIC is continuing its training programme. A specialized training course for experts from the UNMOVIC roster and some UNMOVIC staff members commenced in Argentina on 26 February and will last until 8 March. The main objectives of the course are (a) to develop a good technical understanding by the trainees of the technologies used in the production of solid propellant missiles, in particular the production of composite and double-base propellants themselves, and (b) to improve their skills for the design of monitoring regimes for key solid propellant production sites. This is the third course dealing specifically with production technologies in the missile area with the two previous such courses conducted in Argentina and France. The Commission is grateful to the Government of Argentina for its support for this training course.

## V. College of Commissioners

17. The UNMOVIC College of Commissioners convened its twenty-fifth regular session in New York on 20 and 21 February. Observers from the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons attended.

18. The Acting Executive Chairman briefed the College on the activities of UNMOVIC since the last session and on planned activities for the next quarter. He outlined his thoughts on the continuing interest in various quarters in preserving the experience and expertise residing in UNMOVIC in areas such as inspections in the biological and missile areas, the multidisciplinary approach to inspections, export/import monitoring and verification of dual-use technology, overhead imagery analysis, the roster of trained inspectors and proven training methodology, practical experience in field operations, logistics and support.

19. Two presentations were made in the biological area. The first covered advances in biological verification technologies and its relevance to UNMOVIC activities. The second provided an overview of the Sixth Review Conference of the

Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention held at Geneva in November/December 2006, and its possible effect on the activities of UNMOVIC.

20. The College expressed its appreciation to the Acting Executive Chairman for his comprehensive introductory statement and the presentations made and expressed its support for the ongoing and planned activities of the Commission. The College discussed and expressed a spectrum of views on the Acting Executive Chairman's initial analysis of the available experience and expertise residing in UNMOVIC and his thoughts on where and how they could be preserved and utilized, if so decided by the Security Council. Commissioners will provide additional comments in this regard and they agreed that the matter will be discussed again at a subsequent meeting.

21. It was decided tentatively to hold the next regular session of the College on 23 and 24 May 2007.

22. In accordance with paragraph 5 of resolution 1284 (1999), the Commissioners were consulted on the contents of the present report.

## Annex

## An improved missile verification system

1. In its review of missile inspection practices, UNMOVIC has been refining its verification methods and approaches, based on the Commission's experience and lessons learned. UNMOVIC has also drawn on the work of a panel of external technical experts, convened in June 2005 to assess the missile aspects of the monitoring and verification plan (see the twenty-third quarterly report of UNMOVIC (S/2005/742)). An outline of this improved missile verification system is presented below, greater emphasis being given to describing aspects that provide for increased efficiency and less intrusiveness for on-site inspections while also minimizing the resources needed to ensure the effectiveness of the overall verification regime. While dealing with the overall system of improved missile monitoring, this paper focuses on the indigenous development, production or modification of missiles.

2. In 1991, Iraq was prohibited from developing and acquiring ballistic missiles with a range of more than 150 km.[1] No multilateral arrangements exist governing the development or acquisition of ballistic missiles. However, there are a number of instruments relating to the non-proliferation of ballistic missiles. These include the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Both are voluntary associations of a number of States. The Missile Technology Control Regime limits the proliferation of missiles and related technology, while the Hague Code of Conduct increases transparency with respect to ballistic missile activities. However, only the United Nations has considerable practical experience in the multilateral monitoring and verification of missile and unmanned aerial vehicle activities, from which lessons may be drawn for future application.

### Missile verification system

3. Although the Security Council, by resolution 687 (1991), originally imposed the prohibitions on Iraq referring only to "ballistic missiles", subsequent related documentation[2] clarified that this term extended to other unmanned aerial "means of delivery" — the terminology now generally used. The term "means of delivery" essentially comprises ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles.[3] Unmanned aerial vehicles have become more of a concern in recent years as their numbers and types have proliferated and their potential for delivering weapons of mass destruction has become greater, owing to increases in their range and payload capabilities. They pose a number of new and challenging aspects.

4. The main concern in missile proliferation is range and payload capability. In 1991, the Security Council set a range limit for Iraq's missiles at 150 km regardless

[1] In resolution 1737 (2006), the Security Council decided that all States should take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer to a Member State of items, equipment, goods and technology related to ballistic programmes. Earlier, in resolution 1718 (2006), the Council decided that another Member State should suspend all activities related to and abandon its ballistic missile programme.

[2] In particular, S/22871/Rev.1 (the monitoring plan), and the revised annexes to document S/22871/Rev.1 contained in document S/1995/208.

[3] In the current text, the term "missile" or "delivery system" is taken to include all these, unless the sense denotes otherwise.

of payload. For the Missile Technology Control Regime, the range and payload threshold is 300 km and 500 kg respectively. The Hague Code of Conduct refers to "ballistic missiles" but no particular range or payload value is specified. One of the major challenges for verification of a missile development programme, irrespective of the particular limit values, is that essentially the same basic technologies and processes are involved in manufacturing missiles that comply with or exceed the given limit. Thus, the verification methodology must take this into account and be able to distinguish between any activity, which could be permitted or prohibited in the future.

5. The improved missile verification system is based on three elements, namely,

- Knowledge and understanding of relevant activities and related equipment
- Information on export/import of relevant goods
- Verification and monitoring of compliance.

**Knowledge and understanding of relevant activities**

6. In the experience of UNMOVIC, information needs to be collected on existing or planned missile projects and on activities associated with, or relevant to, missile programmes. This information can come from a number of sources, primarily from the State concerned and from inspections of facilities. Information secured from the State itself is of primary importance as it provides a basis for verification as well as confidence-building. The information should be provided by way of formal declarations and pertain to specified activities, equipments, facilities etc., and be both project-based and site-based. The information required in the declarations should be specified and supplied according to a format prepared for this purpose by the inspection agency. Use of an electronic template may reduce errors and facilitate processing.

7. Information acquired through inspections of various sites is likewise of prime importance. It can lead to confirmation of declared data as well as to the need for further verification activities and could result in uncovering undisclosed information.

8. In addition, collateral analysis of related technical documentation and public media (print media, Internet, etc.) as well as intelligence from Governments and overhead imagery (satellite, reconnaissance aircraft) can provide support. Analysis and assessment of such information could lead to the level of knowledge and understanding necessary to permit decisions on the monitoring system and judgements on compliance.

**Export/import data**

9. States engaged in the development of missiles may have to import or export complete missile systems, related parts, equipment or subsystems. Therefore, in any case where missile verification would be required the identification and tracking of these items would become a crucial component of the verification activities. The identification itself requires a suitable promulgated list of items and a mechanism for receiving the data. UNMOVIC has been reviewing the existing list of missile items described in document S/2001/560 (15 October 2001) which details those items notifiable to UNMOVIC by exporters and importers under Security Council

resolution 1051 (1996) concerning Iraq. In applying measures in the cases of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2006, under Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1737 (2006), regarding the export of all items that would contribute to their development of ballistic missiles, the Council used the Missile Technology Control Regime annex (a list of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology related to ballistic missile programmes), embedding its contents in document S/2006/815. It should be noted that document S/2001/560 is built upon that annex, with the addition of specific provisions for Iraq.

**Verification and monitoring of compliance**

10. The third element of the improved system under development by UNMOVIC involves verification, including on-site inspection. The process of verification, leading to complete and correct knowledge of the real situation, should involve the analysis of all information gathered by the inspection agency. Ideally, the principal means of successfully achieving this goal of complete and correct knowledge will be through inspections of relevant facilities to examine infrastructure, equipment, activities and records and interviewing personnel.

11. Verification through on-site inspections can range in frequency and degree of intrusiveness. A key feature of the improved missile verification system is that future inspections can be less intrusive and more efficient by using two complementary approaches:

(a) Basing the system on "critical points";

(b) Utilizing new sensor and identification technologies.

**Critical points**

12. In the Commission's experience, determining compliance with the obligation not to develop, manufacture, or acquire any proscribed missiles has required conducting verification activities in many areas. This has entailed an extensive programme of activities to obtain comprehensive information and oversight over each and every aspect relating to missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles and their supporting infrastructure falling within the verification domain. It has encompassed, for example, the identification, inventorying and constant surveillance of all the parts and subsystems of each type of delivery system, together with the associated means of production and testing. Such a verification system, essentially using a comprehensive approach, required extensive resources in terms of inspectors and equipment in order to be fully implemented.

13. A modified system involving "critical points" for missile verification is offered in recognition that at all stages involved in the acquisition of a delivery system — research and development, prototype testing, serial production and deployment — there are critical points that cannot be easily avoided or bypassed. Such points can be associated with technologies, processes or pieces of equipment that are indispensable for the acquisition or the testing of a delivery system. A critical point also needs to be able to supply significant verifiable data through inspections, cameras, sensors or other techniques. If these critical points are monitored properly, then other steps or activities that are part of the overall acquisition process may be less important for verification purposes. Concentrating monitoring activities on the

critical points will still achieve verification objectives just as effectively as using a comprehensive monitoring approach because monitoring at these points can provide the information required for verification purposes. These critical points will be the focus of the verification effort. In addition, the application of new advanced monitoring and sensor technologies at such points will allow the collection of data efficiently and less intrusively.

14. To identify and select the critical points it is necessary to fully understand the process of the development and production of a complete delivery system, including the technologies and the equipment involved, as well as alternative ways that could be used to acquire proscribed delivery systems. In general, a delivery system is composed of the following key subsystems:

- The propulsion system which can use solid or liquid propellant (for ballistic missiles and cruise missiles), turbojet engines (used in cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles) or aircraft piston engines (for unmanned aerial vehicles)
- The guidance and control system, which provides the orientation and position of the missile during flight, and applies corrections to maintain the missile on the correct trajectory or flight path
- The payload, comprising items or material that are to be delivered.

15. Some important critical points in a verification system are those related to testing, since testing provides the most significant and reliable information on performance. Testing also covers all the stages in the missile acquisition programme from research, development and mass production and during the operational life. In particular, the static testing of rocket propulsion systems, both liquid propellant and solid propellant, is an important critical point during the development stage and also in production. Flight testing is also an important critical point for ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. In all cases, the configuration of the delivery system being tested (dimensions, payload or provision for payload, number and capacity of fuel tanks etc.), needs to be verified.

16. While static and flight testing are clearly important critical points, the concept of critical point monitoring can be more clearly illustrated by the following three examples. The first can be found in the production processes for a composite solid propellant propulsion system of a missile. A simplified flow chart for this process is presented in figure I. Shadowed boxes represent critical points.




Figure I. Production flow chart for a composite solid propellant propulsion system

Each box of the flow chart represents a major step in the production process. Although each step is necessary, some are more significant from a verification viewpoint because they require very specific equipment or they are points of convergence. In the production flow chart in figure I, specific pieces of equipment are the propellant mixer and the propellant casting chamber where the rocket case is filled with propellant. These are necessary items that are usually co-located because of technical requirements. They will be few in number, if not unique, in the country. Points of convergence are represented by the propellant casting and curing step and the final assembly. The final assembly, for instance, is a critical point because it is where a number of subsystems are integrated, so that focusing on this point will provide corroboration of data from other facilities and will ensure knowledge on the configuration and quantity of missiles being produced. The steps identified above are all critical points. By contrast, other steps, for example the manufacture of the rocket case, do not require particularly specialized equipment and could be carried out in many and varied locations.

17. In developing a verification system, it is also recognized that not all critical points are of equal importance (although obtaining corroborative data from more than one is also necessary). For instance, in the production flow chart in figure I, both the propellant mixing and the propellant casting steps meet the definition of a critical point. Both critical points can provide information on the amount of propellant made and on its composition. In addition, though, information on the size and numbers of propulsion systems made can be obtained at the propellant casting step. This latter step is, therefore, the more useful of these two critical points to use in the verification system and the one where inspection resources should be concentrated.

18. Another example of using critical points is in the production of liquid propellant propulsion systems. A simplified flow chart for those systems, based on flow forming technology, is shown in figure II. The shadowed boxes represent critical points.




Figure II. Production flow chart for a liquid propellant propulsion system

19. In comparison with solid propellant propulsion systems, liquid propellant engine production involves a more extensive infrastructure. A liquid propellant engine consists of a large number of parts that have to be produced and joined together and there are many operations and tests that have to be conducted during this process. The production of all those parts employs numerous general purpose machine tools that can be distributed in many different workshops and in different facilities. An effective way of properly observing this process is to focus on the special machines and their fixtures that are required. In the flow chart in figure II, these are flow forming machines, vacuum brazing furnaces, balancing machines and turbopump testing stations. Those are specialized pieces of equipment that are few in number and their dimensions and operating cycles provide important data in regard to the dimensions and numbers of engines produced. These represent the critical points in this process. In this particular example, all the critical points identified are equal in importance and all of them have to be covered in order to provide a high degree of confidence.

20. In addition to the propulsion system, another major part of a delivery system is its guidance and control system. A simplified production flow chart for guidance and control units is shown in figure III. Again the shadowed boxes represent critical points.




Figure III. Production flow chart for guidance and control units

In the generic production process of a guidance and control unit, as shown in figure III, there are steps that require specialized pieces of equipment. These include measuring equipment (such as multi-axis drift rate tables) for dynamic testing and calibration of the inertial measurement units and larger, more complex dynamic test stands for final testing of the complete guidance and control system. The steps where these pieces of equipment are used constitute critical points in the process of producing guidance and control systems. In figure III, these are shown as shadowed boxes. By focusing attention on those points through inspections, supplemented by the use of video cameras, other suitable sensors and tags, those points would provide key information for the verification of the types and numbers of guidance and control systems produced.

21. Unmanned aerial vehicles are included as one of the means of delivery because of their potential to deliver biological warfare agents in particular, although they could also be used for chemical warfare agents, and even nuclear payloads could be possible. Unmanned aerial vehicles present a particular challenge. Their challenge derives not only from difficulties in covering and observing flight tests, but principally from the following factors: (a) the relative ease with which they could be reconfigured, i.e. both modified to extend the vehicles' range beyond the permitted limit and modified to carry a weapons of mass destruction payload; (b) the fact that an effective biological payload can be as small as 20 litres and hence carried on quite small unmanned aerial vehicles; and (c) the fact that an unmanned aerial vehicle can fly by remote control or autonomously using an autopilot, to increasing ranges. A further factor is the vast array of vehicle types, applications, designs and sizes. Currently unmanned aerial vehicles are principally used for surveillance and reconnaissance, as target drones and, also, for electronic warfare; some vehicles can carry conventional weapons to give them a strike capability.

22. It is more difficult to find useful critical points in the production of unmanned aerial vehicles, compared to ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, basically because their production involves more generic types of equipment and many of the parts are commonly available. Nevertheless, a critical feature which is common to all unmanned aerial vehicles, however acquired, is their guidance and control system, which gives them the ability to fly autonomously to a designated location. The panel

of external technical experts convened by UNMOVIC in 2005 recommended that this system should be the focus, where critical points can be identified, for the verification of unmanned aerial vehicles both in assembly and under deployment. However, as a consequence of the rapid evolution of technologies, today essential components for guidance and control and even pre-assembled autopilots are available commercially. Although such parts may provide only low performance, they are still suitable for unmanned aerial vehicles if associated with an update system. This is not so for ballistic missiles which require higher performances because they are not equipped with an update system and are exposed to a more demanding operational environment. In addition, other features such as the maximum take-off weight capacity, the ease with which it can be reconfigured and the propulsion system should be considered in assessing the range of an unmanned aerial vehicle.

**New technologies**

23. An important factor for consideration in the selection or choice of critical points for incorporation in the verification system is the potential use of sensors. An underlying question to be answered is whether a certain critical point is suitable for the use of a sensor and whether there is an appropriate sensor available that will provide the information required. The difficulty in installing the sensor needs to be assessed, as does whether any sensor installed would cause unacceptable interference to the operation being observed. The reliability of the sensor and the ease with which it might be compromised are also factors. However, the use of sensors cannot only reduce the presence of inspectors on site but can also provide more complete coverage. Some new developments in potentially useful sensors are being explored by UNMOVIC.

24. Technologies being investigated include mechanical vibration sensors, sound sensors, infrasound sensors, programmable surveillance cameras, smart tags, wireless technology and digital memory devices. Sensors using these new technologies could have application in monitoring manufacturing processes, static testing of missile propulsion systems and flight tests of missiles. For example, both mechanical vibration sensors and sound sensors can, in principle, be used to "fingerprint" declared operations on pieces of equipment at critical points and could thus be used to verify the equipment's use. Infrasound sensors, already used in the detection of nuclear tests, offer the potential for use in remotely detecting flight testing and even static testing of ballistic missiles. Modern surveillance camera systems provide many features such as scene anomaly detection, shape recognition, automatic triggering based on a range of user-defined criteria and scene authentication to ensure that images have not been modified or compromised, all of which can be usefully applied in verification activities. Smart tags (radio frequency identification tags) permit a time-saving and non-intrusive way of maintaining inventory oversight of important items such as selected machinery, specialized components and missiles. Modern wireless technology allows for remote collection and transmission of data derived from sensors, thus improving coverage of data collection and giving faster access to information, while permitting a reduction in the presence of inspectors in facilities.

**Ongoing work**

25. The combined use of critical points and new or advanced technologies in inspection and verification can provide more directed and focused information and permit remote acquisition and transmission of data. They can also allow a reduction in both the number and the footprint of inspectors, thus providing more resource-efficient and less intrusive inspections. These new technologies are being further explored by UNMOVIC. The improved monitoring system outlined here, together with other studies conducted by UNMOVIC, such as the use of indicators (described in the twenty-seventh quarterly report of UNMOVIC (S/2006/912)), are contributing to the development of a more effective United Nations verification and inspection capability.

United Nations S/2007/107

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 February 2007

Original: English

**Letter dated 23 February 2007 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council**

I would like to extend my thanks to you for your initiative to respond to the challenge of how to take security sector reform forward within the United Nations. The wide-ranging nature of the topic necessitates a comprehensive and coordinated approach. The Security Council open debate which your Minister presided on 20 February was a useful step to move this agenda forward.

As you are aware, I had the honour to chair an Arria formula meeting on 16 February to allow experts from the field to share their experiences with members of the Council and others. The invited speakers were:

- Laurie Nathan from South Africa, the author of South Africa's Defence White Paper and an expert on local ownership
- Jeanette Eno from Sierra Leone, an expert on women, gender and conflict
- Hariyadi Wirawan from Indonesia, who is a member of Indonesia's Working Group on Intelligence Reform.

The meeting underlined a number of key points for the development of security sector reform. I sought to reflect these in my remarks summing up the meeting. These are annexed to this letter and I should be grateful if you could circulate this letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Emyr **Jones Parry**

07-25054 (E) 270207

## Annex to the letter dated 23 February 2007 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

## Security sector reform: Arria formula meeting, 16 February 2007

### Summary and recommendations

The United Kingdom hosted an Arria formula meeting on security sector reform on 16 February 2007. Invited speakers were Laurie Nathan from South Africa, the author of South Africa's Defence White Paper and an expert on local ownership; Jeanette Eno from Sierra Leone, an expert on women, gender and conflict; and Hariyadi Wirawan from Indonesia, who is a member of Indonesia's Working Group on Intelligence Reform.

The experiences recounted by the three experts from the field emphasized security as a basic human need, and security sector reform, centred on the needs of citizens, as the cornerstone of durable peace. While security sector reform plays an important role in post-conflict environments, it should not be limited to these arenas. Security sector reform is crucial at all stages of the post-conflict transition to development, from the immediate aftermath of a conflict, to the establishment of a democratic State, through to its consolidation and long-term stability.

Contributors agreed that there is no "one size fits all" solution to security sector reform. Security sector reform is contextual and must be adapted to reflect the realities of an individual country. Nevertheless, it should be possible to develop a set of core principles for security sector reform activity that can then be adapted to suit the context required. Strong, effective and accountable institutions must be developed that reflect the needs of the population. National ownership of the process must be assured. Without national ownership and the ability to build on ongoing local and regional processes security sector reform will not be effective and will lack legitimacy. Time should be taken to ensure full participation of all stakeholders in the reform process. Often, the process is as important as the policies ultimately produced.

Speakers also stressed the need for security sector reform to be a long-term commitment in which the international community can and should play a facilitating role. Implementation of the reform policies must also be considered. International organizations such as the United Nations, regional organizations, bilateral donors and the country concerned all have a responsibility for implementation. While national ownership is key, the wide-ranging nature of security sector reform necessitates a comprehensive and coordinated approach. The United Nations can perform this coordinating function and ensure that all commitments are met. It can also ensure that civil society and the local population are able to play a role in security sector reform development.

Speakers highlighted gender mainstreaming as essential for a successful security sector reform process. Women must be encouraged to participate in civilian security structures and support must be given to women's organizations at the national and district level. This ensures a level of public awareness and understanding of the need and purpose of security sector reform that is crucial to its

success. The inclusion of women in security sector reform processes should be monitored under the terms of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security.

Four core recommendations for successful security sector reform were identified during the meeting:

- Security sector reform must entail democratic reform
- Security sector reform programmes must ensure national ownership
- Security sector reform processes must be inclusive and participatory
- Security sector reform must be a people-centred process, which takes place at the local as well as the national level.

United Nations A/61/763–S/2007/108

General Assembly
Security Council

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23 February 2007
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Agenda item 13
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-second year

## Identical letters dated 26 February 2007 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations committed from 15 to 21 February 2007 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 13, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Caroline **Ziade**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

07-24974 (E) 270207 280207

## Annex to the identical letters dated 26 February 2007 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

**Israeli violations, acts of aggression and other activities from 15 to 21 February 2007, inclusive**

**Air violations**

At 2114 hours on 19 February 2007 an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Naqurah, heading east, and circling over areas in the South. It then left at 0012 hours on 20 February 2007, over `Alma al-Sha`b.

At 2200 hours on the same day, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh, heading north. It circled over the Riyaq area, then left over Rumaysh at 0200 hours on 20 February 2007.

Between 0800 and 1145 hours on 20 February 2007 an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah and circling over areas in the South, whereupon it left over Naqurah.

Between 1758 and 2100 hours on the same day, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah and circling over areas in the South, then left over Naqurah.

Between 0925 and 1125 hours on 21 February 2007 an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah, heading north. It circled over the southern regions, where it was met with fire from ground anti-aircraft batteries belonging to the Army (LM-12) at the place known as Jinnata, then left Lebanese airspace over Naqurah.

Between 0945 and 1145 hours on the same day, four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over `Alma al-Sha`b and heading north as far as Rashayya, It then headed towards the sea, circled over areas of the South, Al-Biqa` al-Gharbi (Western Bekaa) and the Shouf mountains, proceeded to a distance of 10 miles out over the sea, then left over the sea off Naqurah.

Between 1350 and 1645 hours on the same day, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, flew over the Nabatiyah region and released heat balloons over the town of Nabatiyah and the village of Duwayr.

Between 2017 and 2225 hours on the same day, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Al-Bayadah. It circled over the southern regions, then left over `Alma al-Sha`b.

At 2227 hours on the same day, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over `Alma al-Sha`b, heading north, and after circling over the southern regions, left over `Alma al-Sha`b at 0017 hours on 22 February 2007.

**Sea violations**

None.

**Field violations**

Between 1015 and 1040 hours 15 February 2007 a bulldozer belonging to the Israeli enemy carried out engineering operations involving stagnant water that had collected within occupied Palestinian territory opposite the Kafr Killa — Al-Udaysah road so as to permit the water to flow into Lebanese territory. Accompanying it was a patrol made up of a Hummer and a military jeep. When a number of Lebanese citizens gathered on the Lebanese side, the enemy patrol was reinforced with two Hummers and an additional jeep.

Between 1935 and 2030 hours on 21 February 2007 Israeli enemy forces shined searchlights from Tayyarat position (opposite the village of Yarun) towards the areas surrounding Yarun and Bint Jubayl.

**Other Israeli activities**

Between 1345 and 1425 hours on 17 February 2007 the sound of movements by tracked vehicles was heard between the Summaqah and Birkat Hasan outposts of the Israeli enemy forces within the occupied Shab`a Farms.

Between 1830 and 1845 hours on 18 February 2007, Israeli enemy forces, from their position at Al-Hadb within occupied Palestinian territory (opposite the village of Yarun), fired four flare shells over the said position.

Between 2000 and 2300 hours on the same day, an Israeli enemy helicopter flew within occupied Palestinian territory (opposite the villages of Mays al-Jabal and Marun al-Ra`s).

At 0947 hours on 19 February 2007 a communication was received from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), reporting that the Israeli enemy was carrying out light weapons fire in area E442 within occupied Palestinian territory (opposite Markaba).

Between 1200 and 1230 hours on the same day, two Israeli enemy helicopters overflew the occupied Shab`a Farms.

Between 0730 and 0820 hours on 20 February 2007 the sound of the movement of tracked vehicles was heard between the Ramta and Fashkul posts of the Israeli enemy forces in the occupied Shab`a Farms and Israeli enemy military aircraft flew over the said Farms.

At 1200 hours on the same day a civil engineering machine (Falasha) belonging to the Israeli enemy carried out road maintenance work between the Saliha post and the Avivim barracks, being accompanied by three Hummers (opposite Marun al-Ra's), and a bulldozer worked on the fortification of the Saliha post from the inside. At 1545 hours all the vehicles left, heading for the Avivim barracks.

Between 1215 and 1245 hours on the same day Israeli enemy forces strafed the area around their outpost at Zabdin and Al-Qarn, within the occupied Shab`a Farms, with medium machine-gun fire.

Between 1530 and 1630 hours on the same day, the sound of the movement of tracked vehicles belonging to the Israeli enemy was heard between its two posts at Ramta and Summaqah within the occupied Shab'a Farms. Also heard were a number of intermittent rounds of medium machine-gun fire coming from the said posts.

At 1600 hours on the same day, during a visit by the UNIFIL Commander, General Claudio Graziano, to the Indian unit's Saddanah post, a number of journalists proceeded towards the occupied Shab'a Farms border in order to take some photographs. Israeli enemy forces fired a number of rounds into the air from their Summaqah position within the said Farms, whereupon the journalists immediately left.

Between 1650 and 1700 hours on the same day, in the place known as Labbunah within occupied Palestinian territory (opposite Naqurah), a number of rounds of fire from light weapons were heard and two helicopters belonging to the enemy forces were seen over the said area.

Between 1910 and 1930 hours on the same day, four Israeli enemy helicopters overflew occupied Palestinian territory (opposite Ra's Naqurah).

At 1310 hours on 21 February 2007 an explosion was heard at the place known as Khallat Wardah (opposite the village of 'Ayta al-Sha'b).

At 1240 on the same day, rounds of medium-calibre machine-gun fire were heard from within occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the village of Yarun.

United Nations A/ES-10/381–S/2007/109

General Assembly
Security Council

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26 February 2007

Original: English

**General Assembly**
**Tenth emergency special session**
Agenda item 5
**Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory**

**Security Council**
**Sixty-second year**

## Identical letters dated 26 February 2007 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

While the Palestinian people remained besieged, confined to a canton-like reality and literally starved, Israel, the occupying Power, continues to launch its campaign of death and destruction against the Palestinian people throughout the occupied West Bank.

The Israeli occupying forces have been conducting since yesterday, 25 February 2007, a wide-scale barbaric military aggression against the already besieged city of Nablus in the northern West Bank, killing one civilian and injuring scores of others in addition to arresting tens of Palestinians, demolishing homes and converting others to military outposts while keeping the families living there hostage, forbidden to move or contact the outside world. Israeli occupying forces have even converted Jamal Abdel Nasser School in the old city into a detention centre. Among the detained is journalist Nayef Breik, who owns the local Sanabel TV station. Israeli occupying forces broke into the station, arrested Mr. Breik and confiscated transmission and other equipment.

Nablus residents woke up on 25 February to the wide-scale incursion, which began with Israeli occupying forces invading Palestinian airwaves and reading out the names of who they called were "wanted" Palestinians. Soon after, the entire city was placed under a curfew, confining tens of thousands of residents to their homes. The Israeli occupying forces also obstructed the movement of medical crews.

Today, 26 February 2007, Israeli occupying forces shot dead 42-year-old Anan Al-Tibi while he was inside his home and injured his son Ashraf, 22 years old. The heinous and brutal killing is but one example of the conduct of Israeli occupying forces against Palestinian civilians and the utter disregard they have for the value of Palestinian life.

Elsewhere in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Israeli occupying forces continue to conduct wide-scale arrest campaigns throughout the West Bank while

07-25041 (E) 270207

maintaining the stranglehold on the Gaza Strip and its 1.4 million residents. Additionally, illegal Israeli settlers continue to carry out attacks against Palestinian civilians and their properties, especially in Hebron. Their impunity is fortified by the turning of a blind eye by the Israeli occupying forces to these attacks, the damage they cause and the terror they spread.

Israel, the occupying Power, also continues to shun international law and relevant United Nations resolutions with regard to its continued construction of the illegal separation wall in the West Bank. Today, 26 February 2007, Israeli occupying forces demolished 10 homes near Tulkarem to make way for the illegal wall. These actions are utterly rejected and are in contravention of international law, international humanitarian law and human rights law. Additionally, they are in grave violation of the advisory opinion of 9 July 2004 of the International Court of Justice and General Assembly resolution ES-10/15.

The Government of Israel also continues its campaign to create a new demographic composition in Occupied East Jerusalem and to alter its cultural and religious heritage through the ongoing demolition and diggings at Bab Al-Magharibeh. These provocative actions, which latest reports indicate are continuing unabated under the cover of night, clearly demonstrate the intransigence of the Israeli Government and its persistence in defying the will of the international community and violating international law and United Nations resolutions.

It must be noted that the historical corridor, which the Israeli occupying authorities now plan to demolish, was wilfully neglected by the Israeli occupying authorities, which did not allow any restoration works despite repeated Waqf warnings of the corridor's deteriorating condition. Additionally, the demolition of the historical corridor at this gate, which is part of the Islamic Waqf, is intended to erase an important part of the occupied city's Muslim heritage to create new facts on the ground by expanding the square at the Western Wall (Al-Buraq) of Al-Aqsa Mosque. It is important to recall that the expansion of this square in the past came at the expense of Palestinian homes in the Old City, which have been illegally demolished by the Israeli occupying forces since 1967.

Moreover, the Israeli occupying forces continue to bar Palestinian worshippers from entering Al-Haram Al-Sharif and illegally detain scores of Palestinians protesting Israeli actions in the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound. On Saturday, 24 February 2007, a 60-year-old Palestinian woman from Beit Hanina in Occupied East Jerusalem, Yusra Al-Rijbi, died of her critical head wounds inflicted by the Israeli occupying forces during demonstrations two weeks ago protesting Israeli excavation and demolition works in the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound.

The Security Council has adopted 16 resolutions regarding the city of Jerusalem, and repeatedly declared that all measures and arrangements taken by Israel, the occupying Power, including legislative and administrative ones, which aim at changing the legal status, demographic composition and character of the city, are null and void and without any legal validity whatsoever. Furthermore, the Council has also repeatedly reaffirmed the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 to all the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, including East Jerusalem. Hence, the Council must now assume its responsibility in ensuring Israel's adherence to these resolutions and its obligations as an occupying Power.

Obviously, Israel, the occupying Power, is crossing all boundaries by intensifying its campaign of siege, imposed starvation, murder, judaization of East Jerusalem and construction of the illegal separation wall as well as the expansion of illegal settlements, amid the inability of the Security Council to stop the Israeli violations of international law and relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions.

We call on all parties to take immediate measures urgently to ensure that Israel, the occupying Power, ends its destructive campaign and fulfils its responsibilities in accordance with international law. Additionally, we call on the international community, particularly the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, to assume their responsibilities in ensuring that Israel respects the de jure applicability of that Convention to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and adheres to its provisions. In this context, it is imperative for the Council to take urgent measures to confront these Israeli actions to ensure respect for international law and to prevent further escalation of the situation in the region.

This letter is in follow-up to our previous 277 letters to you regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 28 September 2000. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 9 February 2007 (A/ES-10/379-S/2007/75), constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, State terrorism and systematic human rights violations committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer

United Nations S/2007/110

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 February 2007

Original: English

**Letter dated 15 February 2007 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a note verbale dated 10 February 2007 addressed to the Embassy of Switzerland (Interest Section of the United States of America) in Tehran from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the violation of air space of the Islamic Republic of Iran by coalition forces operating in Iraq (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) M. Javad **Zarif**
Permanent Representative

07-25229 (E) 280207

## Annex to the letter dated 15 February 2007 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran presents its compliments to the Embassy of Switzerland, Interest Section of the United States of America, and draws the attention of the latter to the following.

According to information received from relevant authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, on 25 Dei 1385 (15 January 2007) at 13.40 local time, two military helicopters belonging to coalition forces operating in Iraq violated Iranian air space in Pave region, Kermanshah Province, and entered 300 metres into Iranian territory.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran expresses its strong protest against this unlawful act, emphasizes the necessity to respect the rules and principles of international law concerning the sanctity of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, and calls for the recurrence of such unlawful acts to be avoided in the future.

No doubt the Government of the United States of America is responsible for the consequences of such unlawful acts.

It would be highly appreciated if the Embassy would transmit this note to the relevant authorities of the United States of America and inform this Ministry of any explanation they might give regarding this unlawful act.

United Nations S/2007/111

# Security Council

Distr.: General
27 February 2007

Original: English

## Letter dated 23 February 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

In my capacity as the representative of the current Chairman of the African Union, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the communiqué adopted by the 70th meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, held in Addis Ababa on 12 February 2007 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nana **Effah-Apenteng**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations
Representative of the current Chairman of the African Union

07-25123 (E) 280207

## Annex to the letter dated 23 February 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English and French]

## Communiqué of the 70th meeting of the Peace and Security Council

The Peace and Security Council of the African Union, at its 70th meeting held on 12 and 13 February 2007, considered the relations between Chad and the Sudan. In this regard, the Council received briefings from the representatives of Chad and the Sudan, as well as from the representatives of Libya, Equatorial Guinea, on behalf of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, and the United Nations.

At the end of its deliberations, the Council decided as follows:

**The Council,**

1. **Takes note** of the report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the relations between Chad and the Sudan [PSC/PR/2 (LXX)], as well as the Report of the AU Fact-finding Mission to Chad and the Sudan from 21 to 27 April and from 3 to 7 June 2006, respectively;

2. **Notes** that, notwithstanding the sustained efforts deployed by the AU, CEN-SAD and the international community, the tension between Chad and the Sudan remains high and insecurity persists at their common border. Council **also notes with concern** the serious humanitarian crisis resulting from this situation;

3. **Stresses** that the situation prevailing on the ground is the result of a combination of several factors, including the existence of armed rebellions, the crisis of confidence between Chad and the Sudan and, in particular, the Darfur (Sudan) crisis, which has assumed a regional dimension, thereby affecting Chad and the Central African Republic. In this regard, Council **underscores** the need to step up efforts with a view to finding a speedy and durable solution to the crisis in Darfur, through the implementation of the phased approach for a strengthened peace support operation in Darfur, including the rapid deployment of the African Union/United Nations hybrid operation, and the re-launching of the political process in order to broaden the support base of the Darfur Peace Agreement and facilitate its implementation, in keeping with the decision taken at its 66th meeting in Abuja on 30 November 2006, which endorsed the conclusions of the High Level Consultation on the situation in Darfur held in Addis Ababa on 16 November 2006. To this effect, Council **requests** the Government of the Sudan and the other concerned parties to provide the necessary cooperation;

4. **Notes also** the importance of a coherent and holistic regional approach for promoting durable peace and stability in the region. In this regard, Council **encourages** the Commission and the relevant regional organizations, in close collaboration with the United Nations and other concerned actors, to work together with a view to organizing a regional consultation on the problems facing the region;

5. **Condemns strongly** the attacks perpetrated by armed groups against Chad and the Central African Republic, which constitute an unacceptable attempt to take over

power by force, in violation of the Lomé Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government. Council **demands** that these armed groups immediately put an end to their attacks and seek a peaceful solution for their grievances;

6. **Condemns also strongly** all the violations of the ceasefire committed in Darfur, as well as all other activities aimed at undermining the Darfur Peace Agreement;

7. **Reaffirms** its commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of all the States of the region, as well as to the respect for the principles governing the relations of good neighbourliness between Member States, as enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the AU. Council **demands** that all the States of the region scrupulously comply with these principles. Council, in particular, **requests** the Sudan and Chad to take the necessary measures in order to prevent and effectively stop the utilization of their territories for the launching of activities undermining the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the other;

8. **Underscores** the need for Chad and the Sudan to scrupulously respect the commitments they have entered into, particularly those contained in the Tripoli Agreement and Declaration of 8 February 2006, as well as in the *Proces Verbal* signed in N'Djamena on 26 July 2006 and the Framework Agreement on the Normalization of Relations of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness signed in Khartoum on 28 August 2006. Council **calls** on the two countries to put in place the implementation and follow-up mechanisms provided for in the said Agreements, and to work towards their effective functioning;

9. **Commends** the Libyan Leader, Muammar Al Kaddafi, for his tireless efforts aimed at contributing to the normalization of relations between the Sudan and Chad and the restoration of security at their common border and **expresses** its support to the efforts being exerted by CEN-SAD. In this respect, Council **invites** the Commission to provide the necessary support to CEN-SAD towards the effective implementation of the commitments entered into by the Sudan and Chad;

10. **Welcomes** the initiatives taken by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to improve the security situation along the borders between the Sudan and Chad and between the Sudan and the Central African Republic, including through the establishment of a multi-dimensional presence, and to contribute to the implementation of the agreements concluded between the Sudan and Chad. Council, bearing in mind paragraph 12 of the decision adopted at its 63rd meeting held in New York on 20 September 2006, **urges** the United Nations Security Council to authorize as soon as possible the multi-dimensional operation envisaged in resolution 1706 (2006);

11. **Urges** the Chadian authorities to urgently engage in dialogue with all the Chadian political stakeholders, including the political and military movements, with a view to finding a consensual solution to the problems facing Chad and to consolidate the democratic process in the country. To this effect, Council **encourages** the Chairperson of the Commission and other involved actors to facilitate such a dialogue and a negotiated solution to the crisis in Chad;

12. **Recalls** its decision PSC/PR/Comm(LXVII) on the Central African Republic adopted during its 67th meeting held on 7 December 2006, endorsing the recommendations of the multi-disciplinary mission of experts which visited Bangui from 3 to 15 April 2006, and **appeals, once more**, to all AU Member States, as well

as to partner countries and institutions, to urgently provide the necessary assistance with a view to consolidating peace in the Central African Republic and facilitating the socio-economic recovery of the country;

13. **Expresses** its profound preoccupation with the serious humanitarian crisis resulting from the prevailing insecurity on the ground. Council **urgently appeals** to all AU Member States and partners to provide the necessary humanitarian assistance and **underscores** the need for the scrupulous respect for international humanitarian law, by all concerned parties;

14. **Decides** to dispatch, as soon as possible, a mission of Council to Chad, CAR and the Sudan and, if the need arises, to other countries in the region, to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the situation on the ground and identify the obstacles impeding the implementation of the agreements signed by the two countries, in particular the Tripoli Agreement, with a view to making recommendations aimed at finding a durable solution to the problems facing the region. Furthermore, Council **decides** that the report of the mission will be submitted to a meeting of Council at the appropriate level;

15. **Decides** to remain seized of the situation.

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Security Council

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27 February 2007

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## Letter dated 23 February 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the communiqué adopted by the 71st meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, held in Addis Ababa on 16 February 2007 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nana **Effah-Apenteng**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations
Representative of the current Chairman of the African Union

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## Annex to the letter dated 23 February 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English and French]

## Communiqué of the 71st meeting of the Peace and Security Council

The Peace and Security Council of the African Union, at its 71st meeting held on 16 February 2007, considered the situation in the Republic of Guinea. The Council received briefings from the Commission and the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Guinea to the African Union.

At the end of its deliberations, the Council decided as follows:

*The Council*,

1. *Expresses its grave concern* over the situation prevailing in the Republic of Guinea and its implications for peace, security and stability in the subregion;

2. *Regrets* the loss of human lives during the January 2007 general strike, and in February 2007. The Council *strongly condemns* the disproportionate use of force and the repression of the civilian population and, in this regard, *requests* the opening of an independent inquiry, with the participation of the African Commission on Human and People's Rights, in order the identify and bring to justice the perpetrators of the atrocities and other acts of violence committed during these events;

3. *Underscores* the fact that the crisis facing Guinea is deep seated, and that it can only be resolved within the framework of open dialogue and consultations among the concerned parties. In this regard, the Council *requests* the Guinean authorities to take immediate and appropriate measures in order to bring to an end all acts of violence being committed by the security forces and facilitate a genuine dialogue among all the stakeholders;

4. *Urges* the President of the Republic and the Government of Guinea to scrupulously respect the spirit and letter of the *Procès Verbal de Négociation* signed on 27 January 2007, including the appointment of a new consensual Prime Minister;

5. *Expresses its support* to the initiatives taken by ECOWAS and its current Chairperson with a view to assisting in the resolution of the crisis. The Council *commends* the efforts of the current Chairperson of the African Union, as well as the initiatives already taken by the Chairperson of the Commission and *requests* the latter to continue working closely with ECOWAS and to intensify his consultations with all relevant institutions, including the United Nations, with a view to establishing the modalities for a sustained and concerted action aimed at the rapid resolution of the crisis facing Guinea, including through the establishment of an appropriate coordination mechanism;

6. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2007/113

Security Council

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27 February 2007

Original: English

## Letter dated 23 February 2007 from the President of the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission has concluded its sixty-second session, which was held at Geneva from 20 to 22 January 2007.

During the opening plenary meeting, Belgium was elected as the President and Indonesia was elected as a Vice-President, joining the Republic of the Congo, the other Vice-President.

Representatives of Kuwait, Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Iran, India and Jordan addressed the Council. Copies of their respective statements are being sent by mail with the original of this letter.

During the session, the Council considered reports on the activities of the Commission since the last session; on the distribution by Governments and international organizations of payments to successful claimants and the return of undistributed funds; on the corrections of awards pursuant to article 41 of the Provisional rules for claims procedure; and on claims pending in the Commission database.

The Council adopted two decisions, one pertaining to the corrections of awards identified in the article 41 report and the other pertaining to the valuation of claims pending in the database.

With respect to the issue of arrangements for ensuring that payments are made to the Compensation Fund, the Council noted that the shortfall of income to the Fund had increased to approximately $53.6 million and also noted that the Government of Iraq is considering draft legislation relating to the development of oil fields and the distribution of oil revenues. The Council requested that the secretariat continue to monitor the issue of the shortfall and that it obtain any relevant information on how the draft legislation would be consistent with the current arrangements.

During the session, the Council also heard a briefing from the secretariat on the status of the implementation of the follow-up programme approved by the Council at its fifty-eighth session in December 2005 to monitor the technical and financial aspects of the environmental remediation projects.

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The Council noted that the secretariat's investigation into the issue of overpayments resulting from multiple claims filed by the same or related claimants had been concluded and recalled its earlier decisions on measures to recover the overpayments, including the requirement that all affected Governments and submitting entities must undertake "best efforts" to recover the overpaid amounts and return them to the Commission. With respect to the current hold on payments to the Islamic Republic of Iran as a result of confirmed overpayments, the Council clarified that the hold should equal the amount of unrecovered "identifiable" overpayment and that any amount in excess thereof should be released. The Council requested that the secretariat continue its communications with the Islamic Republic of Iran on this issue. The Council also heard a report by the secretariat on the best efforts responses received from submitting entities to date.

With respect to the audit of Compensation Commission activities, the Council took note of the audit reports of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on duplicate claims and the Commission strategic planning process, and the responses of the Executive Secretary thereto.

The Council also took note of a report by the Committee on Administrative Matters regarding revisions to the approved budget of the Executive Secretary for 2007.

With respect to requests by the Government of India in its statement at the opening plenary meeting that the Governing Council consider granting an extension of the 30 September 2006 deadline for the location of and payment to unlocated claimants and that it accept 8,050 individual claims for late filing, the Council noted that it had previously considered these requests and declined to accept them.

The Council decided to hold its next regular session from 20 to 22 June 2007.

The Council was informed by the secretariat that the next payment to successful claimants pursuant to Governing Council decision 256 is scheduled to be made in April 2007 and that there are now 43 approved claims in category E (claims of corporations, other private legal entities and public sector enterprises) and category F (claims of Governments and international organizations, including environmental claims), with a total outstanding balance of approximately $30.6 billion, which have not been paid in full. The overall amount of compensation made available to date by the United Nations Compensation Commission is approximately $21.8 billion.

(*Signed*) Alex **Van Meeuwen**
President of the Governing Council

## Annex

### Documents before the Governing Council at its sixty-second session

1. Thirty-sixth report of the Executive Secretary pursuant to article 41 of the Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure (S/AC.26/2006/4).
2. Decision concerning corrections of awards pursuant to article 41 of the Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure (S/AC.26/Dec.262 (2006)).
3. Thirty-seventh report of the Executive Secretary pursuant to article 41 of the Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure (S/AC.26/2007/1).
4. Decision concerning corrections of awards pursuant to article 41 of the Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure (S/AC.26/Dec.263 (2007)).
5. Decision concerning claims pending in the database that contain personal losses (S/AC.26/Dec.264 (2007)).

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# Report by the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of Panama on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received credentials from the First Vice-President and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Panama, signed on 31 January 2007, stating that Mr. Alfredo Suescum has been appointed alternate representative of Panama on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, these credentials are in order.

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# Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia

## I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the statement of the President of the Security Council of 31 October 2001 (S/PRST/2001/30), in which the Council requested me to submit reports at least every four months on the situation in Somalia. The report covers developments since my last report of 23 October 2006 (S/2006/838). The present report has a particular focus on the rapidly evolving political and military situation in Somalia, including the dislodging of the Union of Islamic Courts by the forces of the Transitional Federal Government assisted by Ethiopian troops. The report includes an update on the security and human rights situation, and on the humanitarian and development activities of the United Nations agencies and programmes. Pursuant to resolution 1725 (2006), the report also provides an update on plans to deploy a regional peace support mission to Somalia.

## II. Main developments in Somalia

2. The period under review saw rapid changes in the political and security landscape in Somalia. The Union of Islamic Courts, which had gained control of 8 of the country's 18 administrative regions, was dislodged between 24 December 2006 and early January 2007 by the military forces of the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopia. Remnants of the Union of Islamic Courts militia were then pursued in southern Somalia by Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian forces. Clashes between Union of Islamic Courts militia and forces allied to the Transitional Federal Government began on 21 October 2006 near the town of Buale in the Middle Juba region. Other clashes followed around the town of Burhakaba in the Bay region, 60 kilometres (km) south-east of Baidoa.

3. Following the request of the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Security Council adopted resolution 1725 (2006) modifying the arms embargo on Somalia and, inter alia, authorizing the deployment of an AU/IGAD force to protect the Transitional Federal Government in Baidoa. The resolution also emphasized the need for continued dialogue between the transitional federal institutions and the Union of Islamic Courts. Efforts were made to revive the Khartoum peace process initiated under the auspices of the League of Arab States, which stalled following the postponement of the third round of talks in

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October 2006 owing to differences between the two parties over preconditions and procedural issues. Preconditions set by the Union of Islamic Courts included the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia. The Union of Islamic Courts also objected to Kenya serving as co-chair of the talks on behalf of IGAD. Following the postponement of the Khartoum talks, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, the then Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament, travelled to Mogadishu with a number of parliamentarians, reportedly to encourage the Union of Islamic Courts to resume dialogue with the Transitional Federal Government. Although the Speaker and the Union of Islamic Courts leadership reached an agreement, the Transitional Federal Government refused to accept it on the basis that the Speaker had not consulted with either the Parliament or the Transitional Federal Government.

4. The adoption of resolution 1725 (2006) was welcomed by the Transitional Federal Government but rejected by the Union of Islamic Courts. The latter claimed that the deployment of foreign forces in the country was tantamount to an invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia. Intermittent clashes followed in the Bay region, and, on 7 December 2006, the Union of Islamic Courts took the town of Idale and arrived on the outskirts of Daynune, a Transitional Federal Government military training camp some 30 km south of Baidoa. The fighting soon dissipated, but on 12 December 2006, both sides elevated their verbal attacks, accusing each other of relying on support from foreign elements. Yusuf Mohamed Siyad Indhaade, the Defence Chief of the Union of Islamic Courts, gave Ethiopia seven days to withdraw its forces from Somalia or face a major conflict. On 20 December 2006, just one day after the Union of Islamic Courts deadline, heavy fighting broke out once more in the Bay region and soon spread to the central Galkayo, Hiran and Middle Shabelle administrative regions, where Union of Islamic Courts forces had been confronting warlords of the former Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism, who were allied with the Transitional Federal Government.

5. On 23 December 2006, the Union of Islamic Courts leaders called for jihad against the Ethiopian troops and appealed to foreign fighters for support. In an apparent response to those statements, the Ethiopian Government, on 24 December 2006, admitted that it had combat troops inside Somalia. In an official statement, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said that his Government had taken self-defensive measures and started counter-attacking the aggressive extremist forces of the Islamic Courts and foreign terrorist groups. The Transitional Federal Government forces, supported by Ethiopian ground and air forces, engaged with the Union of Islamic Courts forces on a front stretching more than 400 km, from the lower Juba Valley in the south to the region of Galkayo in central Somalia. Within days, the towns of Bandiradley (Galkayo), Beletweyne (Hiran), Bulo-barde (Middle Shebelle), Burhakaba (Bay) and Dinsor (Bay) fell to the Transitional Federal Government/Ethiopian coalition. Mogadishu and the key port city of Kismayo also fell to the Transitional Federal Government coalition on 28 December 2006 and 1 January 2007, respectively.

6. Remnants of the Union of Islamic Courts forces withdrew to the southern reaches of Ras Kamboni and Afmadow in the Lower Juba region, where they fought against the Transitional Federal Government/Ethiopian coalition. On 8 January 2007, the United States announced that it had carried out an air strike against suspected terrorists linked with Al-Qaeda, who were believed to be fighting alongside the Union of Islamic Courts forces near Afmadow. At the same time, the Transitional Federal Government announced the closure of Somalia's borders, on

security grounds, and called on the international community, particularly the neighbouring States, to help enforce this ban. Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the former head of the executive committee of the Union of Islamic Courts, reportedly surrendered to the Kenyan authorities on 21 January 2007. On 8 February 2007, Sheikh Sharif flew to Yemen.

7. After the fall of the Union of Islamic Courts, the semblance of order and security that the Union of Islamic Courts had created in Mogadishu began to deteriorate. Roadblocks and checkpoints returned, together with banditry and violence, despite the efforts of the Transitional Federal Government to improve security in the capital. On 3 January 2007, Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi announced a three-day moratorium during which armed groups in Mogadishu were to hand over their arms. He warned that if they did not comply, the Transitional Federal Government would carry out forced disarmament. Demonstrations against the plan followed on 7 January 2007, in south Mogadishu. Tensions subsided after the Transitional Federal Government announced the suspension of its forced disarmament programme. On the same day, the Prime Minister nominated a 30-member committee to work on modalities for restoring peace and stability in the capital, but violent incidents targeting Ethiopian and the Transitional Federal Government forces prompted the Transitional Federal Government, with parliamentary approval, to impose emergency laws, allowing President Yusuf to govern the country by decree for a period of three months.

8. On 19 January 2007, unidentified gunmen attacked Villa Somalia, the official Mogadishu residence of the President, with grenades and explosives. Three days later, an attack on Ethiopian forces in Mogadishu left at least four people dead and several others wounded. On 24 January 2007, a mortar attack on the Mogadishu international airport killed one person and injured three others. The attack occurred soon after a United Nations flight had landed, but there were no injuries to United Nations personnel. Since then, several violent incidents, including mortar attacks, have targeted the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian troops in Mogadishu, in particular the nascent police force that has been deployed in the city to restore law and order. No one has claimed responsibility for these incidents. In the course of February 2007, insecurity continued to increase dramatically in Somalia, with almost daily gun, grenade and mortar attacks, most of them hitting the capital. The security situation also remained volatile in the south-west and Lower and Middle Juba regions and in the Kismayo area. The Ethiopian Government started to withdraw its troops in three phases. It also initiated training of former armed elements to be integrated into Somalia's armed forces.

9. The fall of the Union of Islamic Courts has also brought to the fore some of the inter- and intra-clan rivalries that had been suppressed during the conflict. Serious clan-related fighting was reported in Bardera (Gedo region), Tayeglo (Bakool region) and elsewhere. The Transitional Federal Government has yet to establish effective authority or to establish law and order in Mogadishu and other main population centres. The true intentions and future influence of the former warlords also remain to be seen.

10. Public resentment of the continued presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia has created a volatile situation, which has seriously constrained humanitarian delivery and emergency operations in the centre and south of the country. Although the Transitional Federal Government has claimed that it is making substantial gains

against the Union of Islamic Courts remnants, fighting continues, especially in the Ras Kamboni and Bad-Madow areas. On 24 January 2007, a United States gunship was reported to have launched a second air strike against suspected Al-Qaeda operatives in southern Somalia.

11. On 10 January 2007, President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed held separate meetings at Villa Somalia with former Somali Presidents Ali Mahdi Mohamed and Abdikassim Salad Hassan. His goal was to build confidence with their local Hawiye communities. On 12 January 2007, President Yusuf and Prime Minister Gedi met at Villa Somalia with several former warlords, including Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, Muse Sudi Yalahow, Omar Mohamed 'Finish', Abdi Nure Siyad and Abdi Hassan Awale Qaybdid. At the end of the meeting, the former warlords reportedly agreed to disarm and integrate their militias into the national army and police services. However, at the time of the meeting, militiamen of Mohamed Qanyare Afrah clashed with the Transitional Federal Government guards outside Villa Somalia and six militiamen died as a result.

12. Reacting to the recent developments in south-central Somalia, the three main political parties in "Somaliland" issued a press statement on 14 January 2007, reaffirming the independence of "Somaliland" from the Transitional Federal Government. They said that the people of "Somaliland" would oppose any claim over their sovereignty.

13. On 15 January 2007, President Yusuf appointed a new administration for the Benadir district, which includes Mogadishu. On 17 January 2007, the Transitional Federal Parliament held an extraordinary session in Baidoa, under the chairmanship of the Second Deputy Speaker, Osman Elmi Boqore, to consider a motion of impeachment against Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden. The Speaker was accused, inter alia, of abandoning his responsibilities and supporting armed opposition groups bent on destabilizing the Transitional Federal Government. The vote for impeachment was carried by 183 in favour and 9 against. On 31 January 2007, the Parliament elected Aden Mohamed Noor Madobe, former Minister of Justice, as its new Speaker. The newly elected Speaker was sworn in on 3 February 2007. In his address to Parliament, he promised to take part in the reconciliation process and appealed to the group of parliamentarians allied to his predecessor to return to Somalia. On 7 February 2007, Prime Minister Gedi reshuffled his Cabinet, with the approval of the President. In line with the agreed power-sharing formula, he gave seven ministerial posts to each of the four major clans and named three ministers from the fifth clan.

## III. Activities of the United Nations and the international community

14. With the impasse in the Khartoum talks in the last quarter of 2006 and the growing rift between the Speaker and the Transitional Federal Government, my Special Representative, François Lonseny Fall, engaged in shuttle diplomacy with a view to promoting peace and stability in Somalia. On 20 November and 4 December 2006, he visited Baidoa and Mogadishu, respectively, in an effort to revive the dialogue. He appealed to the Transitional Federal Government leaders to maintain the unity of the transitional federal institutions and to resolve their differences with the Speaker. He urged the Union of Islamic Courts to halt their military expansion

and encouraged both parties to return to the Khartoum talks without preconditions. He also undertook a regional tour to promote peace and stability in Somalia and the region. The tour included Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Sudan, Uganda and Yemen. In the course of the mission, he also had discussions with the leadership of AU, IGAD and the League of Arab States.

15. The International Contact Group on Somalia was also actively engaged in the region. The Contact Group met in Nairobi on 19 October 2006, and strongly urged the leadership of the Transitional Federal Government and the Union of Islamic Courts to attend the third round of talks at Khartoum. The Contact Group expressed concern over the increasing militarization of Somalia and recognized the need for the parties to abide by earlier commitments. The Contact Group also recommended that the Khartoum process be co-chaired by the League of Arab States and Kenya, as Chair of IGAD. The aim was to harmonize regional initiatives and present a common approach to peace and security in Somalia.

16. Following the postponement of the Khartoum talks, the League of Arab States and Kenya continued their efforts to revive the dialogue. A Kenyan delegation visited Mogadishu in mid-November 2006, hoping to allay some of the misgivings of the Union of Islamic Courts about IGAD's proposed co-chairmanship of the talks. Discussions followed on 1 and 2 December 2006, in Djibouti, between delegations from the Union of Islamic Courts, the IGAD secretariat and Kenya.

17. On 5 January 2007, the Contact Group met in Nairobi and confirmed its readiness to provide immediate support for the stabilization of Somalia based on Security Council resolution 1725 (2006), the effective functioning of the transitional federal institutions, and the provision of humanitarian and recovery assistance. The Contact Group also emphasized the need to launch without delay an inclusive process of political dialogue and reconciliation embracing representative clans, religious and business leaders, women's groups and other representatives of civil society who reject violence and extremism.

18. The European Union Commissioner for Humanitarian and Development Aid, Louis Michel, visited Baidoa and Mogadishu on 20 December 2006. He urged both parties to avoid conflict and to resume dialogue at the earliest opportunity. On 7 January 2007, some members of the Contact Group met with representatives of civil society who flew from Mogadishu to Nairobi to exchange views on the way forward.

19. After the routing of the Union of Islamic Courts, my Special Representative travelled to Mogadishu on 18 January 2007, and met with President Yusuf at Villa Somalia. He commended the President for his efforts to promote reconciliation in Mogadishu, including reaching out to clan elders and former Presidents Abdikassim and Ali Mahdi; and for the agreement he made with the former warlords to disarm their militias. He encouraged the President to continue his efforts to improve security, advance reconciliation and preserve the unity of the transitional federal institutions. While in Mogadishu, he also met with representatives of civil society.

20. The situation in Somalia was also one of the main issues on the agenda of the eighth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union held in Addis Ababa from 29 to 30 January 2007, which I attended. I had the opportunity at that gathering to discuss the situation in Somalia with various regional leaders, including the Presidents of Djibouti, Kenya and Somalia, the Prime

Minister of Ethiopia and the Chairperson of the AU Commission. I encouraged all partners to impress upon the Somali Government the importance of engaging in an inclusive political process in order to create favourable conditions for the deployment of a peace support mission and to promote reconciliation in Somalia. On the sidelines of the meeting, on 30 January 2007, President Yusuf announced his intention to call a national reconciliation congress, which would be inclusive of all but extremist Islamists.

21. The independent national reconciliation commission of the transitional federal institutions held a multi-stakeholder workshop in Mogadishu from 3 to 12 February 2007, with support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the participation of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS). The objectives of the workshop, attended by 250 participants, were to identify ways to improve the security situation in Mogadishu and develop a consensus around a voluntary process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

22. The International Contact Group on Somalia met again on 9 February 2007, in Dar es Salaam, during which the members reiterated the need for the Transitional Federal Government to establish broad-based and representative institutions and an all-inclusive political process, as envisaged in the Transitional Federal Charter.

## IV. Deployment of a peace support mission

23. Since the adoption of resolution 1725 (2006), efforts have been under way to expedite the deployment of a peace support mission to Somalia. The AU Peace and Security Council met on 19 January 2007 to discuss implementation of the resolution, and subsequently revised its original deployment plan for the peace support mission previously known as the Peacekeeping Mission of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Somalia (IGASOM). When it became clear that IGAD would be unable to deploy IGASOM, it was decided that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) would be deployed, at the strength of nine infantry battalions, with 270 police officers and a civilian component. The AU Peace and Security Council approved the deployment of AMISOM for six months to contribute to the initial stabilization phase in Somalia, and it requested the United Nations and the Security Council to provide all the support necessary for the speedy deployment of AMISOM, including the review of resolution 1725 (2006), in the light of the recent developments in Somalia and the provision of financial support. The AU Peace and Security Council also urged the Security Council to consider authorizing a United Nations operation in Somalia that would take over from AMISOM at the expiration of its six-month mandate.

24. Kenya, on behalf of IGAD, sent delegations to several African countries in January 2007 to encourage their participation in the peace support mission. President Yusuf travelled to Rwanda for the same purpose. AU sent a mission to Mogadishu in January 2007 to discuss the deployment of AMISOM with the Transitional Federal Government. Uganda has agreed to provide up to two battalions for the operation, and Burundi, Ghana and Nigeria are considering contributing troops for this mission. Other AU member States are considering providing logistical and transport support for AMISOM, including Algeria, which has offered airlift support. On 12 February 2007, the AU Commission convened a meeting with Uganda and other potential troop contributors, as well as with AU partners, to

discuss logistical and financial aspects related to the deployment of AMISOM and to establish a coordination mechanism to ensure adequate support for its deployment.

25. The United States announced that it would provide $14 million, as well as strategic airlift support, to assist the peace support mission. The Foreign Ministers of the European Union (EU) met in Brussels on 22 January 2007, and expressed readiness to consider support in the order of 15 million euro from the African Peace Facility as soon as the necessary requirements are met, including authorization by the United Nations. The EU offer of financial support for AMISOM is within the framework of a concerted global effort to encourage an all-inclusive political dialogue and genuine reconciliation in Somalia.

26. On 28 January 2007, an extraordinary meeting of IGAD member States was held on the sidelines of the AU summit in Addis Ababa. The meeting included all IGAD members, except Eritrea. The meeting welcomed the decision of AU to deploy a peace support mission to Somalia and called on the Security Council to take all necessary measures to convert AMISOM into a United Nations peace support mission, as per the decision of the AU Peace and Security Council.

27. In response to a request from the Chairperson of the AU Commission for the United Nations to send experts to assist in supporting the development of a detailed operation plan for AMISOM, I dispatched a small team of technical experts from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNPOS to Addis Ababa in early February to jointly assess the planning support and other requirements of AU for the establishment and management of AMISOM. Based on those consultations, it was concluded that AU will need to augment considerably its headquarters capacity in Addis Ababa with a number of planning specialists in different areas. AU is currently exploring how its partners, including the United Nations, could support it in this regard, including ways to source staff and generate funding.

## V. Humanitarian situation

28. The humanitarian situation in south-central Somalia has deteriorated over the last three months due to the compounded effects of the flood emergency and the intensification of conflict. Heavy rains in Somalia and the Ethiopian highlands during November 2006 brought large-scale flooding to parts of southern Somalia, displacing an estimated 454,000 people in the Juba and Shabelle riverine regions. At the time of the floods, 1.8 million people were already in urgent need of humanitarian assistance and protection. Of those, 1.1 million were in the southern regions, where the flooding occurred.

29. A multi-agency flood response was mounted to assist affected communities. However, many flood victims were also living in areas where the humanitarian community had a minimal operational presence due to prevailing insecurity. To overcome those difficulties, a United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination team was deployed and two helicopters were mobilized by the World Food Programme (WFP) to provide coordination and logistical support to the efforts of United Nations agencies and partner non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

30. With the onset of conflict on 24 December 2006, flood response activities virtually ground to a halt when the United Nations and NGOs had to relocate their

staff to Nairobi and air operations were suspended following the announcement by the Transitional Federal Government of the closure of the borders of Somalia for security reasons. Overland access to south-central Somalia was further complicated following the decision of the Government of Kenya on 25 December 2006 to seal its border on security grounds. The approval given on 7 February 2007 by the Government of Kenya for humanitarian assistance to enter Somalia via overland routes is a welcome development that will enable humanitarian actors to assist vulnerable groups, including some 5,000 Somali internally displaced persons who were dispersed along the border with Kenya waiting to cross for over a month.

31. It is estimated that some 70,000 people were displaced by the recent fighting in south-central Somalia. Humanitarian access has resumed in Wajid, Baidoa and Galkayo, but remains limited elsewhere, including in Jowhar, Merka and Mogadishu. In addition, Kismayo, where a possible outbreak of Rift Valley Fever is a serious concern, remains inaccessible to United Nations flights, given the lack of security guarantees by the Transitional Federal Government. However, road conditions have improved and convoys operated by private contractors have resumed, enabling the maintenance of a minimum level of assistance.

32. The 2007 consolidated appeal for Somalia is currently funded at only 2 per cent of the requirements. The appeal seeks $237 million for 128 projects through 14 United Nations agencies, 16 international NGOs and nine local NGOs. The appeal covers eight key sectors (access; food security and livelihoods; protection; shelter; health; nutrition; water and sanitation; education) and three cross-cutting sectors (early recovery; gender and HIV/AIDS; and logistics and support services). The appeal will be revised in the light of the post-*deyr* food security assessment, which indicates an improvement in the overall food security situation in south-central Somalia following abundant rains, with a significant exception being the riverine areas in Gedo and the Juba Valley, where farmland was damaged by the floods and planting hindered by overall insecurity.

## VI. Human rights and protection

33. The general human rights situation in Somalia has been aggravated by continued insecurity. Particular concerns include the displacement of populations, restrictions on the media and human rights defenders, and violations of the human rights of women and children, as well as infringements on civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.

34. Most of the people displaced by the recent fighting were believed to be supporters of the Union of Islamic Courts and were displaced following serious threats from Ethiopian and Transitional Federal Government troops. Kenya's decision to seal its border with Somalia effectively stranded these people near the border town of Dobley without assistance or protection. The Kenyan authorities also deported back to Somalia 420 Somalis who were registered with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on the Kenyan side of the border. The action of the Kenyan Government was criticized by UNHCR and the international community as a clear violation of international law. The Kenyan authorities also apprehended about 34 individuals suspected of being Union of Islamic Courts fighters and handed them over to the Transitional Federal Government during the second half of January 2007. Their identities were not

disclosed and the conditions of their deportation were perceived to be in contravention of the international humanitarian framework, which implies a specific protection mechanism. The fate of those individuals is not known.

35. Particular protection concerns arising from the recent conflict have included the harassment and detention of aid workers by Ethiopian and Transitional Federal Government forces. There have been acts of retaliation against individuals considered to have sympathized with the Union of Islamic Courts and against specific groups, including the Oromos. Reports from Somali human rights organizations indicate a general atmosphere of fear in Mogadishu, with Ethiopian and Transitional Federal Government forces involved in regular house-to-house searches.

36. Limits to freedom of expression are a serious concern throughout Somalia. Several radio stations were closed down and several journalists arrested during the period under review. In October 2006, the Union of Islamic Courts authorities shut down the East Africa Radio station based in Mogadishu for its alleged links with Bashir Raghe Shirar, a former warlord, and for alleged misinformation campaigns. Three journalists who covered the fighting between the Transitional Federal Government and the Union of Islamic Courts were arrested by the Transitional Federal Government while returning from Burhakaba to Baidoa. In December 2006, the Secretary General of the National Union of Somali Journalists was arrested and held for one day by the Union of Islamic Courts in Mogadishu without being given any specific reason. Following the imposition of emergency law, the Transitional Federal Government on 15 January 2007 ordered three radio stations in Mogadishu (Shabelle Radio, Radio HornAfrik, and Voice of the Koran) and the office of Al-Jazeera Television to be closed. The Transitional Federal Government accused them of inciting violence, but the ban was lifted the following day after discussions with the broadcasters.

37. In "Puntland", the smuggling of Somali and Ethiopian nationals from Bossasso to Yemen continued during the final quarter of 2006, with around 11,015 individuals, mainly Somalis and Ethiopians, undertaking this perilous journey by sea. In a bid to avoid the Yemeni coast guard, the smugglers usually force their passengers to leave the ships when still far from shore. In 2006, some 637 Somalis and Ethiopians reportedly drowned.

38. Following a decree by "Puntland" authorities on 25 September 2006, hundreds of Somali internally displaced persons were arrested and sent back to south-central Somalia. In addition, the authorities, without applying the provisions of international human rights and humanitarian laws, deported 1,370 Ethiopian migrants back to Ethiopia. These deportations, in poor conditions aboard trucks, were reported to be life-threatening. While recognizing the right of "Puntland" authorities to deport foreigners who reside illegally in "Puntland", the international community has urged the authorities not to deport Ethiopians who could be in need of international protection and whose lives and safety could be endangered if they are returned to Ethiopia. As a result of these concerns, a pre-screening centre was set up by the international community, with the approval of the "Puntland" authorities.

# VII. Operational activities to promote peace

## A. Reconstruction and Development Framework for Somalia and transition planning

39. The United Nations country team has identified priorities for the United Nations system for the next six months in south-central Somalia to provide assistance to the Somali people in line with the priorities of the Reconstruction and Development Framework for Somalia. The priorities focus on support to the stabilization of south-central Somalia through the strengthening of the transitional federal institutions. This aim can be achieved only through inclusive dialogue for reconciliation and the provision of urgent services to the population, so as to achieve noticeable improvements in the lives of Somalis. Components of the plan include: (a) institutional capacity-building focused on a number of key institutions and local administrations; (b) support to the establishment of the rule of law and security, in particular through policing and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; (c) the provision of urgent basic social services via the Transitional Federal Government and local government, as envisaged in the Transitional Federal Charter and the Reconstruction and Development Framework, in particular through a back-to-school campaign and essential health services; (d) urgent assistance to vulnerable internally displaced persons, including assisting authorities with small-scale resettlement programmes; and (e) employment and livelihood recovery for peace. The plan is based on and is complementary to the activities and priorities identified in the Somalia consolidated appeals process for 2007.

40. The joint needs assessment began in mid-2005 to provide an assessment of rehabilitation and transitional recovery needs and a five-year reconstruction and development plan for Somalia. This consultative and participatory process has been coordinated jointly by the United Nations and the World Bank, working in partnership with the Somali authorities and other stakeholders, particularly civil society and donors. Based on the findings of the joint needs assessment, the Reconstruction and Development Framework for Somalia was prepared, and is in the last phases of consultation and finalization. It lays out national priorities, with a costed results-based matrix, for the next five years at the national level as well as in three region-specific plans. The overarching goal of the framework is to promote peace and reduce poverty. It will serve as the framework for all development interventions in Somalia in the coming years.

41. In the second half of 2006, the United Nations country team, under the leadership of the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, took a resolute stance towards stronger integration among the agencies and to align their agency-specific country programmes starting in 2008. The United Nations country team has begun work on a United Nations transition plan that will cover the period 2008-2009, in order to align its support with identified national priorities in the Reconstruction and Development Framework and to ensure a concerted and focused approach of the United Nations country team in support of the transition period.

## B. Governance

42. The Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal Government created a task force chaired by the Deputy Minister of Interior to coordinate a district-based process of reconciliation, as a preamble to the participatory selection of district councils. Supported by UNDP and the United Nations Office for Project Services, the process was effective in achieving locally accepted administrations. The process, led by members of Parliament from relevant clans, with civil society facilitation, links local governance to federal authorities and aims to address underlying local conflicts that have fuelled warlordism over the past 15 years. The process has concluded in the Bay and Bakool regions, with the exception of two districts. The task force is expected to cover all regions of south-central Somalia within nine months, giving priority to Mogadishu and border districts. The task force is leading a participatory process to develop a city charter for the Mogadishu administration, to be followed by a participatory process to select the relevant authorities.

43. The participation of women in governance offers hope for a shift from clan-based conflict towards local governance for service delivery. On 9 December 2006, the Prime Minister decreed a quota of 30 per cent for women in all government institutions, including the civil service and district and regional councils. On the same day, the "President" of "Puntland" issued a similar decree mandating a quota of 20 per cent for women in all "Puntland" government institutions. The "Puntland" administration began immediately to appoint women members to existing district councils. With the support of UNDP, the "Puntland" administration concluded its five-year plan, harmonized with the joint needs assessment findings.

44. UNDP continues to play a key role in facilitating the Transitional Federal Parliament session that began in Baidoa in early 2006. During the ongoing parliamentary session, several bills have been passed pertaining to: the Government budget; the establishment of a civil service commission; plans to establish district and regional administrations; and the formation of a national reconciliation commission.

45. Under its Trust Fund for Peacebuilding, UNPOS recently implemented a peace and reconciliation project in the Sool and Sanaag regions. The key objective of the project is to support community-level reconciliation and peacebuilding in order to promote an environment conducive to peaceful and harmonious coexistence among clans.

## C. Judiciary and the rule of law

46. In October 2006, a seminar to support the reactivation of the judiciary was held in Baidoa. As a result, Supreme Court judges and members of the Judicial Service Council were appointed by the Transitional Federal Government President. The Judicial Service Council has also re-established regional courts in the Bay and Bakool regions.

47. With support from UNDP, the Transitional Federal Government trained 600 graduates of Labatinjirow Police Training Centre in December 2006. The police

larger initiative to re-establish the Somali Police Force. UNDP and the Transitional

Federal Government are currently working together to strengthen law enforcement in Mogadishu.

## D. Community-driven recovery

48. In partnership with the World Bank, the United Kingdom Department for International Development and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) is spearheading a community-driven recovery initiative to strengthen local capacities to respect and protect the rights of women and children through a participatory dialogue on rights. By the end of 2006, 15 community development committees had collaborated with 7 district councils to improve social capital and expand social service delivery. This initiative has demonstrated the importance of good governance and reconciliation at the district level. Several other United Nations agencies are involved in promoting community-led recovery, including the International Labour Organization, which is operating programmes for rapid employment creation through the provision of public services such as garbage collection.

## E. Internally displaced persons

49. There are almost 1 million internally displaced persons in Somalia. As in other conflict situations, most are moving to urban slums, where the majority of inhabitants lack adequate shelter and basic services. Somalia's slum population has increased 500 per cent since 1995. During the reporting period, UNDP completed a census of some 7,000 settlements in conjunction with partners and local counterparts, gathering vital socio-economic data. A Millennium Development Goals report for Somalia containing these findings will be published at the end of February 2007. UN-Habitat has been responsible for implementing the Somalia Urban Development Programme in "Somaliland" and "Puntland". It also coordinates a number of inter-agency initiatives for internally displaced persons countrywide. These activities combine community participation and municipal capacity-building with capital investments in shelter and infrastructure. For Mogadishu, the United Nations priorities for the coming six months include integrated planning for medium-term resettlement of, and immediate assistance to, those internally displaced persons who are currently living in public buildings.

## F. Health

50. As part of the response to flooding and conflict in south-central Somalia, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria distributed over 161,700 insecticide-treated nets by mid-January 2007, reaching the vast majority of the initial priority target of 101,242 children under the age of five and pregnant mothers. The Global Fund's ongoing initiatives to provide artemisinin-based combination therapy and rapid diagnostic test kits for malaria have helped combat the risk of a large scale outbreak.

51. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) responded to the needs of

integrated into the emergency response. UNFPA provided reproductive health supplies for safe motherhood and antenatal care, including sets of emergency equipment for the provision of hospital level emergency obstetric care, and personal hygiene kits for women through health centres, including three mobile health clinics to meet the needs of internally displaced persons.

52. UNFPA improved safe motherhood and comprehensive antenatal services for women in south-central Somalia (Huddur district) through support to mother and child health clinics, which provide assisted delivery, including emergency obstetric care, and training to midwives and traditional birth attendants, and facilitated delivery referrals to clinics from the surrounding area.

53. Limited data indicates an HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of around 1 per cent in Somalia. A comprehensive surveillance plan is in place, and the threat of HIV/AIDS has galvanized a united front in "Puntland", "Somaliland" and south-central Somalia. With support from the international community, line ministries and civil society, including religious leaders, are building partnerships in all regions to avoid a major epidemic. The establishment of AIDS commissions and secretariats in each region offers the possibility for all Somalis to coordinate their efforts in this area. Somalis already have one agreed strategic framework to combat infection. They are now working on a single integrated prevention, treatment, care and support mechanism guided by a harmonized monitoring and evaluation framework that promotes shared technical management, coordination and information exchanges. The HIV/AIDS response is a building block for reconciliation efforts at a technical level, above politics.

54. At the General Assembly high-level meeting on HIV/AIDS in New York in June 2006, "Puntland", "Somaliland" and south-central Somalia, led by the Transitional Federal Government Minister of Health, agreed to ambitious and realistic national targets for HIV prevention, treatment, care and support towards the goal of universal access by 2010. The three Somali entities also hosted a meeting in Hargeisa aimed at concrete action on the regional partnership to address HIV vulnerability and cross-border mobility in the Horn of Africa. Representatives of AIDS commissions from Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, the Sudan, "Somaliland", "Puntland" and south-central Somalia discussed ways of jointly responding to HIV vulnerability among mobile populations and the host populations with whom they interact.

55. During the reporting period, UNICEF continued to support the establishment of national AIDS commissions and capacity-building for Somalia's three zones. These multisectoral local government institutions are now operational in "Somaliland", "Puntland" and south-central Somalia. In particular, the South and Central AIDS Commission continued efforts to scale up awareness campaigns during the emergency situation. Acutely aware of the danger of increased prevalence among populations on the move and under stress, the Commission has continued its work in a volatile and insecure environment. Surprisingly, results tallied from Global Fund projects during this period have shown that despite floods and conflict, there has been an overall increase in the number of people reporting to voluntary counselling and testing sites and participating in awareness-raising activities.

UNFPA also strengthened the capacity of youth organizations and individual youths (peer-to-peer) to raise awareness of youth on reproductive health issues, including on HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted illnesses.

## G. Water and sanitation

57. UNICEF successfully mounted a rapid response across flood-affected areas of Somalia despite limited access to many locations and the withdrawal of international staff in September 2006. The dedication and commitment of the national staff facilitated a robust relief operation in many of the hardest hit locations, utilizing pre-positioned stocks of emergency relief supplies. Over 75,000 vulnerable people were reached by the end of November 2006 and over 265,000 people by mid-January 2007. During the initial response in the severely affected areas of Hiran, water trucking was also used to ensure that about 32,000 people had access to safe drinking water. Hygiene-related activities reached over 115,000 people, resulting in improved knowledge of the benefits of adopting safe hygiene practices.

## H. Gender

58. UNFPA, the United Nations Development Fund for Women and UNDP initiated a joint programme with the aim of developing a national gender policy framework for Somalia, including for gender mainstreaming of the Transitional Federal Government and the "Somaliland" and "Puntland" administrations. A 16-day campaign of activism to end violence against women was held from 25 November to 10 December 2006, for the first time spearheaded by the ministries responsible for gender. The campaign advocated for women's human rights issues and for more technical support to the ministries of gender in such areas as gender budgeting.

59. To mobilize support against the severe violation of women's human rights that comprise female genital cutting/female genital mutilation, and to advocate for the eradication of the practice, UNFPA facilitated a series of round tables in "Somaliland" and "Puntland" for experts, community and religious leaders and high-level officials from the two administrations. UNFPA also supported awareness-raising among journalists in "Somaliland" on sexual- and gender-based violence and strengthened their capacity to monitor and report on violations of women's human rights in Somalia.

## I. Child protection

60. The child protection monitoring and reporting mechanism, established in accordance with Security Council resolution 1612 (2005), is in the process of finalizing an annual report for submission to the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, outlining six grave violations of children's rights in Somalia. While many reported violations were a result of inter-clan conflict, the majority resulted from increased tension and conflict between the Union of Islamic Courts and the Transitional Federal Government and their respective allied forces. The monitoring and reporting mechanism is gathering [illegible]

violations perpetrated by the Union of Islamic Courts and the Transitional Federal Government and other parties in Somalia. These include denial of humanitarian access, the killing and maiming of children, increased recruitment and use of children in armed forces and groups, attacks on schools and hospitals, and abductions.

61. In December 2006, the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia formally reminded both the Union of Islamic Courts and the Transitional Federal Government of their obligations to uphold international standards and laws concerning the recruitment of children under the age of 18 into armed forces and groups, and to ensure the immediate release of any children in these forces. This was followed by a letter to the Transitional Federal Government in early January 2007 from the UNICEF Representative, calling for the release of children who had participated in the recent conflict as combatants or in supporting roles. UNICEF sought the safe return of these children to their families. Both letters urged parties to take a public stand against the use and recruitment of children in their forces. In mid-January 2007, the UNICEF Representative again raised the issue in person with the Deputy Prime Minister, who agreed to take the issue before Parliament and the President for immediate action.

## VIII. Observations

62. The current situation may represent the best opportunity that Somalia has had in years to find a long-term solution to its protracted conflicts by putting in place a functioning and effective state under the framework of the Transitional Federal Charter. At the same time, the risks of renewed and prolonged insecurity will increase unless the Transitional Federal Government is able to rapidly consolidate its authority and ensure stability and the rule of law. In order to do so, the Transitional Federal Government must reach out to key political and social forces in Somalia and engage in an inclusive dialogue. The aims are to make the transitional institutions more representative, promote national reconciliation and broaden acceptance of the Transitional Federal Charter as the framework for governance until the elections envisaged for 2009.

63. The challenges ahead are enormous. There is a need to improve security, provide basic social services to the population, strengthen the capacity of governance institutions, and embark on the socio-economic reconstruction of the country. The United Nations will continue to support the Government and civil society to meet these challenges and to turn the page on a dark period in Somalia's history. However, while the international community can assist, the primary responsibility for moving the process forward lies with the Somali authorities and people.

64. Dialogue and reconciliation are essential prerequisites to achieve these tasks. I welcome the steps taken so far by the Transitional Federal Government towards dialogue, peace and reconciliation. I encourage the Transitional Federal Government to make the process as inclusive and transparent as possible and to engage with all the key stakeholders, including clan elders, religious leaders, business groups, women's groups and other representatives of civil society. Those who renounce violence and extremism and pledge to constructively engage in achieving a sustainable political settlement in Somalia should be included in the process. An

inclusive dialogue and a genuine political process are the only ways to achieve a sustainable peace that denies dissatisfied groups a rallying point for conflict. The dialogue should address critical political and security issues, including a comprehensive ceasefire and an agreed framework for disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating Somalia's militias, consistent with the National Security and Stabilization Plan. I urge the international community to provide the transitional federal institutions with the necessary support to sustain the dialogue process and establish representative local administrations conducive to peacebuilding.

65. The Transitional Federal Charter provides the framework for the way forward. The Charter gave the Transitional Federal Government five years in which to draft and complete a federal constitution and organize elections. It is therefore essential that the Transitional Federal Government take the necessary steps in the time remaining, while maintaining a spirit of dialogue and consensus. The Transitional Federal Government needs to be proactive in this regard. It needs to step away from its entrenched positions and send a positive signal to its international partners, who are standing ready to support an inclusive process of dialogue and reconciliation.

66. Warlords were responsible for much of the conflict in Somalia of the past 16 years. They defied and undermined the authority of the present Transitional Federal Government and spread insecurity in the country. It is my hope that they will abide by the agreement reached with President Abdullahi Yusuf to disarm their militias. I also want to caution against any assumption that the fall of the Union of Islamic Courts will automatically bring peace to Somalia. There are clear indications that a significant number of "spoilers" remain active in Somalia. I am particularly disturbed by the growing insecurity in Mogadishu and the continuation of military operations in other areas. I condemn all acts of violence in Somalia and call on all parties to cease hostilities and engage in peace efforts.

67. There is an urgent need to stabilize the situation in Somalia to help create the conditions conducive for dialogue and reconciliation and to facilitate the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces. I welcome the decision of AU to deploy troops in Somalia for an initial period of six months, as well as the intention of Ethiopia to withdraw its forces. I appeal to the international community to assist AU in mobilizing the funds and other assistance necessary for the deployment of AMISOM. To be effective, it should be well planned, well prepared and well equipped, and robust enough to make a difference on the ground. But, above all, I would like to emphasize that a viable political process is also crucial from a peacekeeping perspective. Peacekeepers should be deployed in support of, rather than as a substitute for, a political process. Otherwise, they could quickly be perceived as partial and become a party to the conflict.

68. In accordance with resolution 1744 (2007), I intend to send a technical assessment mission to the AU headquarters and, security conditions permitting, to Somalia to examine the political and security situation and the possibility of a United Nations peacekeeping operation following the AU deployment. I will then provide the Council with recommendations covering the United Nations further engagement in support of peace and security in Somalia, as well as further recommendations on stabilization and reconstruction.

69. In the meantime, the United Nations will continue its efforts to address the serious humanitarian needs in Somalia. I encourage the international community to continue to generously support relief and development assistance efforts in the

country. I call on all Somali parties to provide unhindered humanitarian access for relief efforts, as well as guarantees for the safety and security of humanitarian aid workers, and to respect the fundamental human rights of all people in Somalia.

70. Recent developments in Somalia amply demonstrate the degree to which national and regional security conditions are intertwined in the Horn of Africa. Long-term security for Somalia will not be possible without addressing the regional aspects of the crisis. In this regard, I wish to underscore the need to explore measures to deal with the regional dimension of the Somali crisis and to find ways to address the security concerns of Somalia and its neighbours.

71. Finally, I wish to reaffirm my deep appreciation to my Special Representative for his leadership and continued efforts to foster inclusive dialogue and reconciliation among the Somali people. I call upon all Somali parties and Member States to continue to give him their fullest support and cooperation in pursuit of this goal.

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# Security Council

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## Letter dated 21 February 2007 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Republic of the Sudan wishes to have retained on the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized item 4 in paragraph 10 of the summary statement by the Secretary-General on matters of which the Security Council is seized and on the stage reached in their consideration (S/2007/10 of 9 February 2007), namely the item entitled "Letter dated 20 February 1958 from the representative of the Sudan addressed to the Secretary-General (S/3963)".

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Abdalmahmood **Abdalhaleem**
Permanent Representative